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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary markets the mass distribution of goods most often occurs
through intermediate sellers. Moving from the manufacturer to the ultimate buyers,
products will pass through the hands of one or more intermediaries variously called
whole sellers, distributors, dealers or retailers. For convenience we will refer to these
various intermediaries by the general term "dealers". This distribution process will
require a chain of sales contracts. A sale is by nature "the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price.'" The chain of distribution is the chain of title of goods. To take
the simplest, two-step case, a car manufacturer may sell a new vehicle to the retail car
dealer that, in turn, may sell the vehicle to the ultimate buyer. The two separate contracts
of sale are between the manufacturer and the dealer and the dealer and the ultimate buyer.
In this, and in more complicated distributional schemes involving multiple
intermediaries, the manufacturers and the ultimate buyers are not as a matter of form
parties to the same contract. Their names do not appear together on the same contract
document as parties assenting to the bargain. They do not sign the same written sales
agreement. Thus, it is customary to say that the manufacturer and the ultimate buyer are
contractually remote that the somewhat strange thing we call "privity of contract" does
not exist between them.
U.C.C. §2-106(1) (1999).
Despite the absence of conventional privity, there will frequently be communications,
which pass from the manufacturer (or related corporate entity acting on behalf of the
manufacturer) to the ultimate buyer. The manufacturer may actively assume the role of
warrantor by sending a communication along with the goods or the manufacturer may be
found to have made a warranty independently of the distribution process by advertising
addressed to the public.
It has recently become common to refer to warranties that accompany the goods
as "pass through" warranties. They accompany the goods down the chain of title. They
run with goods much as a traditional warranty of good title runs with the land in real
estate transactions. The warranty booklet that comes with the new car, the warranty
certificate in the box in which the computer is delivered, the manufacturer's label
attached to the herbicide container are all examples of "pass through" warranties.
"Pass through" warranties tend to provide a comprehensive statement of the
manufacturer's legal responsibility for the quality of the goods. They provide limited
warranties in the sense of stating both an affirmative warranty commitment and
restrictions or limitations on the commitment. Disclaimers, remedy limitations, time
restrictions accompany assurances.
The package of commitment and restriction is presented as part of the contract.
The warranty package is a precisely defined statement of the warrantor's legal
responsibility. The manufacturer intends this warranty package to run to the benefit of
the ultimate buyer and also to restrict the rights of that ultimate buyer. Particularly with
respect to new vehicles, equipment and other complex products some type of limited
"pass through" warranty is necessary to induce the purchaser of the product. The dealer
is authorized to deliver the "pass through" on behalf of the remote warrantor. Without
too much strain, one could even say that the warranting manufacturer joins the ultimate
sale transaction for the limited purpose of giving a limited warranty.
In contrast with "pass through" warranties, warranties made in advertising
addressed to the public are separated in time and space from the ultimate sale transaction.
The manufacturer may describe the goods or announce their capabilities in newspapers or
magazines or on TV or radio or other media address to the public. In these situations, the
communications are separated from the immediate distributional process. But at times
statements in media advertising are held to be express warranties under the present article
2 of the UCC. Advertising warranties are an "end-run" direct from the manufacturer to
the targeted audience of prospective buyers. Advertising warranties have an impact on
the human psychology. Advertising companies in order to engage the attention of the
consumer create impressive advertisements. Mostly, consumers buy the goods because
they are impressed by the words used on the advertisement. Actually many of those
create an express warranty. Sometimes wording on the advertising materials may
mislead the consumer or the words used on the advertising material are false. Even in
those cases the consumer is impressed with the advertising mostly without knowing that
they create an express warranty or are false. Most consumers have little knowledge
regarding the accuracy of the information given in those advertisements. According to
the manufacturers "advertising is not supposed to inform, but to persuade."- The more
the consumers are persuaded, induced to buy the goods and impressed with the
See John A. Howard & James Hulbert. Advertising And The Public Interest. 2 ( 1 973).
advertising, the more they buy the goods of the manufacturers. Therefore, the language
used in the advertising materials is always attractive and impressive. "Advertising
contributes to economic growth by complementing the efforts to create new and
improved products through expenditures for research and development."' Advertising
and its effects on human beings have been described in these terms:
"[AJdvertising, by acquainting the consumer with the values of new products,
widens the market for these products, pushes forward their acceptance by the
consumer and encourages the investment and entrepreneurship necessary for
innovation. Advertising, in short, holds out the promise of a greater and speedier
return than would occur without such methods, thus stimulating investment,
growth, and diversity.""
In contrast to "pass through" warranties, advertising warranties do not provide a
comprehensive statement of the manufacturer's legal responsibilities. Normally, the
advertising states the positive. Whatever the restrictions are on warranty liability, they
will normally be found apart from the advertising in contract documents of the
distributional process including "pass through" warranties accompanying the advertised
product. One of the critical issues with respect to advertising warranties is their
relationship to the formal documents in the chain of title. Does the warranty affirmation
create liability distinct from those documents or the warrantor's liability restricted by the
limitations of the formal contracts?
Both "pass through" and advertising warranties carry the characteristic of
adhesion contracts. In adhesion contracts, the stronger party can dictate the terms of the
contract to the weaker party, who has no chance to negotiate on the terms of the contract.'
' See Jules Back.man. Advertising And Competition 22 (1967).
'See Id. at 22.
'
Cf. Anthony T. Kronman. Paternalism and the Lav.- of Contracts. 92 Yale L.J. 763. at 770 (1983).
The three elements must be satisfied before an adhesion contract may be found. Those
are:
"(1) the agreement must occur in the form of a standardized contract prepared or
adopted by one party for the acceptance of the other, and (2) the party proffering
the standardized contract must enjoy a superior bargaming position because the
weaker party virtually cannot avoid doing business under the particular contract
terms, and (3) the contract must be offered to the weaker party on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, without the opportunity for bargaining."^
The sales law in the United States was initially formed under the influence of the
English Sales Act. The English Sales Act derived from the principles of the Common
Law. In the early half of the 20'^ century. Professor Samuel Williston drafted the
Uniform Sales Act based on the model of the English legislation. One can say that when
the UCC was drafted, the drafters were still influenced by the Uniform Sales Act and its
English model. In this connection, during the drafting process of the UCC the drafters
focused on the express warranties, which are directly negotiated between the merchants.
In some ways this statutory treatment of express warranties in the original article 2 of the
UCC is puzzling. Professor Karl Llewelyn believed that the UCC should be adapted to
recurring business situations. Moreover, Llewelyn was certainly aware of both "pass
through" and advertising patterns. However, the warranty rules of article 2 did not
address these recurring patterns of warranty. These patterns may have been avoided
because of the controversy concerning privity of contract.^ The "pass through" and
See Batya Goodman, Honey. I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement As An
Adhesion Contract. 21 CaRDOZO L. Rev. 319, at 328 (1999).
The comment to section 37 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which was prepared by Karl Llewelyn
reads as follows "This section consolidates and systematizes the material of Original Act, sections 12, 14
and 16 and the better case-law thereunder.
Direct Scope: The section is limited is limited in its scope and direct purpose to dealing with warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as a part of a contract for sale; but the section does not thereby constitute
any approval of the view still sometimes judicially expressed that warranties or equivalent obligations are
in their nature confined to contracts for sale or to the direct parties to such a contract. Quite apart from the
fact that warranties anse in a bailment of hire whether such bailment is itself the main contract, or is merely
advertising warranties were not the drafting focus of the present article 2. The courts
have been forced to try to extend the statutory provisions of the present article 2 to "pass
through" and advertising warranties. The proposed revision of article 2 attempts to
address the needs of the new age and expressly address the "pass through" and
advertising warranties in separate sections of the new article. For the first time, article 2
will be drafted for this warranty area to follow Llewelyn's drafting philosophy.
In this thesis, after examining the express warranties under the present article 2,
"pass through" and advertising warranties will be examined under the present and under
the proposed revision of article 2, respectively. In this context, the advantages and the
disadvantages of the revision and the gaps of the present article 2 will be examined.
lines of case law growth, and section 43 on beneficianes. expressly recognizes the development within a
particular area which the cases have demonstrated to be sound. Beyond that this act leaves the matter to the
case law, with the suggestion from section 1 (3), that the policies laid down in this act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they anse.
CHAPTER II
EXPRESS WARRANTIES UNDER THE PRESENT ARTICLE 2
A. IMPORTANCE OF WARRANTY LAW IN ECONOMIC LOSS CASES
In commercial life, products often do not perform as expected. Both business and
consumer buyers encounter disappointed expectations. When the result of expectations is
economic, the disappointed buyer must normally look to the law of warranty for a
remedy. Warranty law becomes the critical source of the buyer's rights, because tort law
claims in negligence and strict liability are not available when the loss is economic*
Economic loss has been defined by the Illinois Supreme Court as:
"[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of any personal injury or
damage to other property, as well as the diminution in value of the product
because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold."^
In other words, economic loss is "the damage flowing directly from insufficient
product quality."'" Under the economic loss doctrine "once loss is defined as economic it
cannot be recovered at least in negligence or strict tort and perhaps not in fraud or
misrepresentation."" It can be said that economic loss doctrine is the separation line
between "what is tort and what is not.'"- When an action is brought "to recover damages
^ See eg East River S.S. Corp., v. Transamenca Delaval Inc. 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986); Spnng Motors
Distnbutors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555. 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
"" Moorman Manufacturing Co.. v. National Tank Co.. 91 Ill.Zd 69. 435 N.E.2d 443. 61 111. Dec. 746 (1982).
'° See J.\MES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS. UNIFORM C0MMERC1.^L CODE § 11-5. at 405 ( 5th ed. 2000).
''White & Summers, supra note 10, § 10-5. at 395.
' White & Summers, supra note 10. § 11-5. at 405.
for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of defective goods this one is for
economic loss.'"^ Economic loss has two types. Direct economic loss "includes ordinar\'
loss of bargain damages: the difference between the actual value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted.'"'' Another type of
economic loss, namely, consequential economic loss, "encompasses all economic harm a
purchaser suffers beyond direct economic loss.'"- Losses like lost profits and loss of
good will are t>'pically consequential economic losses. The normal remedy to recover for
any of these losses is in warranty, which is considered to be a contractual rather than tort
remedy.
B. INTRODUCTION TO EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In general terms, warranty is "an assurance or guaranty, either express in the form
of a statement by a seller of goods, or implied by law, having reference to and ensuring
the character, quality or fitness of purpose of the goods. "'^ UCC article 2 governs the
sale of goods and the creation of express warranties with respect to the sale of goods." In
this connection "the law of warranty has borrowed its concepts from the legal coffers of
tort, contract, and property.'"** Implied warranties may closely resemble tort claims. But
express warranties are customarily thought of as contractual.
The words and the actions of the seller are critical to the establishment of express
warranties. '"^ Section 2-313 of the UCC sets out the elements of express warranty. Under
[- White & Summers, supra note 10. § 1 1-4. at 404.
See § 2-l\4{2): see also WHITE & SUMMERS. 5wpro note 10. § 1 1-5. at 405.
White «& Slmmers. supra note 10. § 11-5. at 405.
""Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (6'*' ed. 1990).
U.C.C. §2-102(1999).
Douglas J. Whaley. Problems and Materials on Commercial Law 69 (2nd ed. 1990).
Cf. Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Sales Law Domestic and International 254 (1999).
section 2-313, an express warranty can arise either from a seller's promises or statements
relating to the goods'" or descriptions of goods-' or from models or samples of goods that
the seller presents to the buyer." The key requirement which all of these
communications must satisfy is to be "part of the basis of the bargain."-' This
requirement is vague in meaning and does not answer the question of whether the
affirmations made after or before the bargain also create express warranties. Section 2-
313 distinguishes between the seller's opinion and an affirmation of fact that becomes a
part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty is created; but an opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. Accordingly, only the
affirmations of the seller are deemed to create an express warranty. In other words, if the
seller expresses his opinion regarding the product, this does not create an express
warranty. Section 2-313(2) declares "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods
does not create a warranty." In deciding whether a statement of a seller is mere puffing
or an affirmation of fact, the background of the events, the parties to the transaction and
the ultimate aim of the parties must be taken into consideration.
Once validity has been established, section 2-313 has "universal application in
that it applies both in present sales and in contracts to sell and without regard to whether
the seller is a manufacturer, grower, or merchant, or whether he regularly or casually sells
goods of the kind in question."-^ Hence, "an express warranty arises when the seller does
-''SeeU.C.C. §2-313(l)(a).
-'5<?eU.C.C. §2-313(1) (b).
-5t?^U.C.C. §2-313(1 )(c).
- Cf. John L. Amabile, Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts. Chapter 72. Warranties. 5
Bus. & Com. LiTiG. Fed. Cts. S. llA.see also WILLIAM H. Lawrence & William H. Henning,
Understanding Sales AND Leases OF Goods § 5.02. at 120(1996).
-" See American Law of Warranties. § 2:3. at 98 (Clark, Boardman. Callaghan eds. 1991 ).
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something affirmative to create buyer expectations about the characteristic or
performance of the goods."-- To this end, a seller can make oral or written representation
regarding his product through advertising, brochures or written contract, which may
qualify as part of the basis of the bargain, rather than puffmg.-* Section 2-313(l)(a)
points out that "any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer, which
relates to the goods''-^ may qualify. The drafters of article 2 seem to have visualized
express warranties as emerging from the negotiations of the parties.
Comment 1 of section 2-313 states
"Express warranties rest on dickered aspects of the individual bargain, and go so
clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are
repugnant to the basic dickered terms."'^
As will be explained below, if the statements of the seller relate to the essential
aspects of the bargain then they are said to create an express warranty. Furthermore,
these statements are hard to disclaim since they are related to the essential terms of the
bargain and they are explicit.
According to Comment 3 of section 2-313
"The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the seller, descriptions of
the goods or exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other part of a negotiation
which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific intention to make warranty is
necessary if any of these factors is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual
practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain
are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance
on such statements need be shown in order to wave them into the fabric of the
agreement. Rather, any fact, which is to take such affirmations once made, out of
the agreement requires clear affirmative proof The issue is normally one of
fact."^^
-^ See Whaley supra note 18. at 71
.
-^
Cf. WHALEY supra note 18. at 12: see also U.C.C. § 2-3 13(l)(a) (noting that "any affirmation ").
"U.C.C. §2-3 13(1 )(a),( 1999).
-'U.C.C. §2-313, cmt. 1 (1999).
-'U.C.C. §2-313 cmt. 3(1999).
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Under section 2-313(2) it is not necessary that the seller use formal words such as
warranty or guarantee. To this end "the Code does not limit express warranties to
specific declarations about the products and sometimes vague and general
communication will suffice."^'' In applying the law of express warranties the courts have
two crucial duties: first, in deciding if statements are part of the basis of the bargain or
that jury could so regard them, and second in determining whether warranties apply to
third parties.
C. DISTINCT ELEMENTS OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In order for an express warranty to be valid, the UCC has provided explicit
elements, which must be met.
1. SELLER'S REPRESENTATION OF THE GOODS
Section 2-313 "describes the various forms of an express warranty, since an
affirmation of fact or promise relating to the product represents the most common way to
create an express warranty."^' Warranties can be found in the advertising materials, in
owners' manuals, in the brochures, or as a clause in the sales contracts or as a separate
contract.^- A seller can even make an express warranty with an oral representation. A
seller can create a warranty in the form of an affirmation of fact, or promise relating the
goods, a description of the goods, or a sample or model of the goods.
'" See 1 Julian B. McDonnell & Elizabeth J. Coleman. Commercial and Consumer Warranties §
5.02[2][b]. at 5-15 (1998).
Debra L. Goetz, et.al.. Special Project: Article Two Warranties In Commercial Transactions: An Update,
11 Cornell L. Rev. 1 1 59, 1 1 70 { 1 987).
" Cf. Special Project, supra note 3 1 . at 1 1 70.
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It may seem that the UCC is explicit regarding the formulation of express
warranties; however, the UCC "does not require a warranty to be stated with any degree
of preciseness."" The code merely says that where a seller's statements are an
affirmation and such statements constitute the basis of the bargain and hence, an express
warranty is formed.^'' However, the specificity of the statement can be important since
specificity supports the conclusion that the affirmation is part of the basis of the bargain.
A seller's statements about the goods does not always create a warranty. Section
2-313(2) provides that an affirmation merely of the value of the goods, or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty. For instance, "statements of the seller that his product is of good
quality and that the buyer will be pleased with the results are merely opinions and not
express warranties."''
When examining alleged opinions, a separation must be made, "if the statements
of opinion become basis of the bargain, opinions can become warranties."'^ American
courts have further qualified the use of opinions as the basis for express warranties. For
example where "the seller has superior knowledge of the matter to which a statement
relates, it is more likely that his statements with respect thereto will be deemed an express
warranty rather than a mere opinion."" In that circumstances, the buyer will have less
'' Kimberly Castelaz et.uL. Products Liabilin: 63 Am. Jur. Prod. L.. § 683 (1996).
'*
Cf. Castelaz et.ai. supra note 33. at § 683; see also Shotkoski v. Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. 195 Neb.
22. 237 N.W.2d 92 (1975); Elanco Products Co., v. Akin-Tunnel! (Tex. Civ. App. Amanllo) 474 S.W.2d
789. writ refd n.r.e. ( 1 972) and affd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds (Tex. Civ. App. Amanllo) 5 1
6
S.W.2d 726 (1975).
^' See Castelaz et.ai. supra note 33. at § 684; see e.g. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Moushon (4'
Dist) 93 111. App. 2d 280. 235 N.E.2d 263 (1968); Chase Resorts. Inc.. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (Ed Mo)
476 F. Supp. 633, ajfd 620 F.2d 203 (1980).
'*' See Castelaz et.ai.. supra note 33, § 684.
See Castelaz et.ai.. supra note 33, § 684.
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knowledge regarding the performance, quality or the value of the good in the market than
the seller will have. For instance in Diepeveen v. Larry- Vogt, Inc./'' the New Jersey
Superior Court indicated that where a seller or manufacturer of a product states that the
product is superior for the buyer's needs to the product that the buyer had requested, it is
likely that such statement will be held to be an express warranty.^''
On the other hand, ''in the statement where the seller assumes to assert a fact of
which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of
which the seller has no special knowledge then the seller's statement is not an express
warranty.""" In this situation, if the buyer knows that the good is defective or has a less
value than the seller is representing, then the statements of the seller do not constitute an
express warranty.
The limit of the seller's opinion is also important in differentiating whether a
statement constitutes a warranty. Although it is often difficuh to draw the line between
seller's talk and warranty, "the more specific the statement, the more likely it is to
constitute a warranty.'""
Statements as to quality, condition or purpose of product may also constitute
express warranties. In Valley Datsim v. Martinez^- the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
noted that when the seller of a new car states to the buyer that the car is in 'excellent
condition', such statement is an express warranty. On the other hand, in Royal Business
'* Diepeveen v. Larry Vogt. Inc., 27 N.J. Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (1954).
"
Cf. generally Diepeveen v. Larry Vogt. Inc.. Id.
**' See Castelaz et.ai. supra note 33, § 684.
"' DouTiiev.Abe.x Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (lO"' Cir. 1984).
'- Valley Datsun v. Martinez. 578 S.W.2d 485 (1979).
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Machines, Inc., v. Lorraine Corp."^ the court stated that a seller who states that the goods
are of 'high quality' is merely making an opinion and not a warranty.
Hence, a good rule in determining warranties based on sale by description is that
an express warranty is valid only when the description of goods is the basis of the
bargain. In another decision by the United States Court of Appeals 5'^ Circuit in S—C
Industries v. American Hydroponics System, Inc.,*^ the court decided that technical
specifications may constitute an express warranty. To this end, the court deemed the
technical specification a description and in this regard, it constituted an express warranty.
The seller's statements must establish the basis of the bargain and a basis for the purposes
of creation of a warranty.
A description of the goods can also create an express warranty. This is set out in
the subsection 1(b) of section 2-313. In one case^' the Georgia Court of Appeals found
that the description of an aircraft as "Aero Commander, N-2677 B, Number 135, FAA,
Flyable"^ was an express warranty that the aircraft complied with the Federal Aviation
Regulation Part 135, concerning instrument and visual flight.
2. THE BASIS OF THE BARGAIN
What constitutes the basis of the bargain? That is the key question in litigation
under section 2-313. But section 2-313 does not define the term "basis of the bargain."
The drafting history may show why this vague phrase was chosen.
'"^ See Royal Business Machines, Inc.. v. Lorraine Corp.. 633 F.2d 34 (1980).
" See S~C Industnes v. Amencan Hydroponics System. Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (1972).
'
Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp., v. Simon, 122 Ga. App. 524, 177 S.E.2d 803 (1970).
^ See Id. at 526-27. 177 S.E.2d at 805.
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Prior to the adoption of the UCC, Uniform Sales Act (USA) was in force in most
states. The USA was drafted by Professor Samuel Williston. According to section 12 of
the USA:
"Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.""^
This language seems to require the plaintiff to prove reliance on the affirmation.^**
In this connection, "it might be suggested that the pre-code law required change because
it was too burdensome to require buyers to prove that they relied on seller's
representation or promise. "^^ It was also stated that " according to Williston, the warranty
need not be the sole inducement to the buyer to purchase the goods and as a general rule
no evidence of reliance by the buyer is necessary other than the seller's statements were
of a kind which naturally would induce the buyer to purchase the goods and that he did
purchase the goods.'"'"
As can easily be seen "Williston considered reliance to be essential to the creation
of an express warranty."" Williston suggested a two-part reliance test:
"If a seller's affirmation had the 'natural tendency' to induce reliance—that is, if it
would induce a reasonable person in the situation of the purchaser to buy the
goods—then no proof of actual reliance was required. If, however, such a
''U.S.A. § 12(1950)
**' See generally 2-2> Samuel WILLISTON. WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15-17 (Mary Anne Foran ed., 5'*' ed.
Clark, Boardman. Callaghan eds 1996)
*" White & Summers, supra note 1 0. § 9-5. at 35 1
.
^° WHITE & Summers, supra note 10. § 9-5. at 351.
"" See Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express Warranties: "Real
World" Consumers Dont Read Warranties. 45 S.C.L. REV. 429. 437-38 (1994); see also SAMUEL
Williston. The Law Governing Sales of Goods At common Law and Under The Uniform Sales
Act §206 (rev. ed. 1948).
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'natural tendency' could not be shown, plaintiff bore the burden of proving actual
reliance."'"
In the Uniform Revised Sales Act (URSA), which was an expansion and
development of the Original Uniform Sales Act, the warranties section moved closer to
section on express warranties that later appeared in UCC article 2. Reliance was also not
required for the purposes of the creation of express warranty.
Unlike the USA, the UCC does not contain an explicit requirement of reliance.
However, instead, it requires that the promise or affirmation become part of the basis of
the bargain. In this context, "the reason why the law has been changed is unclear.'"'
White and Summers have said that "it is possible that the drafters did not intend to
change the law, or that they intended to remove the reliance requirement in all but the
most unusual case, or that they intended simply to give the plaintiff the benefit of a
rebuttable presumption of reliance."'"
The UCC defines the agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact."" One step
further, it has been suggested that the term basis of the bargain means "the sum of all the
reasons why the parties are willing to perform some exchange or the aggregate of terms
upon which the parties agree to that exchange."'^ The legal reasoning is indicated in the
comment 1, which states that "express warranties rest on dickered aspects of the
individual bargain."" It has been thought that Code implies with that the substantial
See Adier. supra note 51. at 434; see also Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Is There A Reliance Requirement^. 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 468. 472 ( 1991 ).
' White & Summers, supra note 10, § 9-5, at 350.
* White & Summers, supra note 10. § 9-5, at 350.
' The Restatement Of Contr.acts (First Restatement) which defines the bargain as "an agreement
of two or more persons to exchange promises or to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a
performance."; .vee also for the definition of the "agreement" U.C.C. which defines as "the bargain of the
parties m fact." U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
"^ See Hodaszy. supra note 52. at 495 ( 1991 ).
-"
U.C.C. 2-313 cmt. 1 (1999).
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points of the bargain, which may affect the existence of the contract. In the comment 1
of section 2-313 the term "dickered" is not explained. However, from the reading of the
comment, it can be said that the "dickered aspects" are the essential terms of the contract,
including the quality of the goods. Therefore, when the seller makes a statement
regarding the dickered aspects of the goods then those statements constitute an express
warranty. This view is also supported by the words "go so clearly to the essence of that
bargain," which can be construed as that the statements of the seller are related to the
essential terms of the bargain. In this regard, in the last sentence it is clearly mentioned
that the statements of the seller are hard to disclaim, since they are obviously related to
the essential terms of the contract and explicit.
The language of the Code "does not explicitly require that the statement induce
the purchase or that the buyer rely on the statement, however, the opinions are divided as
to whether reliance is demanded."^* Comment 3 of section 2-313 explicitly states that
any affirmation is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and "that the plaintiff
need put in no evidence unless the defendant offers evidence of the buyer's non-reliance
no particular reliance on a seller's affirmation during a bargain need be shown. "•'*
Although reliance is not an articulated requirement some courts require the reliance of the
buyer.'^ On the other hand some courts do not require the reliance of the buyer on the
affirmations of the seller.*"' It has been thought that reliance should not be applied or
required to express warranty cases since the UCC does not require reliance explicitly.
I McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.02[1]. at 5-12.
^^ White & Summers, supra note 10, § 9-5. at 352.
'^ See e.g. Rhodes v. Lodi Door Inc.. 1986 W.L.2 13427 (D.Utah 1986); Smith v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 599
A.2d320(R.I. 1991).
"' See e.g. Lutz Farmsv. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 ( lO"" Cir. 1991 ); Unified School Dist. No. 500 v.
United States Gypsum Co..^788 F. Supp. 1 1 73 (D. Kan. 1992).
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One of the most important points of the basis of the bargain issue is that the
buyers or consumers have in general less knowledge than the seller has. Particularly in
these circumstances, it can be said that seller's statements made during the bargain
become express warranty. However, once again, the real life facts such as the buyer's
knowledge of the false representation must be taken into consideration in the decision
process.
Statements of the seller after the time of the contract formation may be express
warranties if they become a part of the basis of the bargain. If the consumer relies on
those statements after the time of the formation of the contract, they can become an
express warranty only if they constitute a part of the basis of the bargain." Section 2-313
of the Code "raise a presumption that the statements relating to the goods made by the
seller at any time during the commercial relationship are warranties."**^ Comment 3 of
the section 2-3 1 3 of the Code states that
"in actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a
bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods, hence no particular
reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them in to the fabric
of the agreement. Rather, any fact, which is to take such affirmations, once made,
out of the agreement, requires clear affirmative proof '"^
"The policy explanation for the presumption" as it was precisely mentioned "is in
an economy characterized by mass production and distribution of technical products, the
drafters of the Code concluded that the seller would regularly know more about the
product from its greater experience with the product, either as manufacturer, merchant or
"-
Cf. 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.02[2] [c] [ii], at 5-16.
^-'
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 5.02[2] [e], at 5-18.
'^ U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt.3 (1999); proceeding on the path of the language of the code and the accompanying
comment, some courts have held that a buyer need not show reliance in order to recover for a breach of an
express warranty see e.g. Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co. 948 F.2d 638 (10'^ Cir. 1991); Wmston
Industnes. Inc., v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. 55 Ala. App 525. 317 So. 2d 493. cert. den. 294 Ala. 775, 317 So.
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consumer."*' In this regard, it has been thought that it would be more convenient to
presume that a warranty is created when the seller makes statements about the goods to
the buyer during the bargain period.
The specific statements as to capabilities or age of a product are the main pillars
to be found as part of the basis of the bargain and held to be an express warranty.^
However, under the section 2-313 the affirmations of fact as to merely of the value of the
goods are not express warranties. On this point, the seller has to have a superior
knowledge in order to be found as part of the basis of the bargain.
3. WHAT IS THE ACTUAL ROLE OF RELIANCE?
When the buyer is purchasing a good from the seller, generally the buyer relies on
the statements of the seller regarding the goods. It can be said that for the purposes of the
creation of an express warranty, reliance of the buyer during the bargaining process on
the statements of the seller regarding the goods is the condition of being a part of the
basis of the bargain. At this point also the statements of the seller prior, during and after
the bargaining process carry great importance.
As a beginning, "section 2-313 of the UCC never mentions reliance, requires only
that a seller's affirmations, descriptions, or samples be a part of the basis of the bargain
for a buyer to bring an express warranty claim."*'' At this point scholars are divided
2d 500 (1975); Interco. Inc. v. Randustnal Corp. (Mo. App) 533 S.W.Zd 257 (1976), see also Special
Project, supra note 31. at 1 174-75.
'"'
1 McDonnell & Colem.an. supra note 30. § 5.02 [2] [e], at 5-19.
'^ Cf. 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 5.03 [1] [a], at 5-22.
*" See Adler. supra note 51. at 433.
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between two views. '^ One view represents that reliance is necessary. White and
Summers states on that issue that:
"[I]t is clear that an advertisement can be a part of the basis of the bargain. The
language of Comment 3 is limited to affirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain. One would not regard an advertisement as being
made during a bargain and therefore no statement in an advertisement would
normally qualify for the presumption that may be authorized in Comment 3."*''
In this context, it can be said that White and Summers states that reliance is
required for a provision to form part of the contract. To this end. their application of the
reliance is only for inter praesentes dealings which occur at the time of the bargain. '° On
the other hand, some other scholars support the opposite view.'' Their view is, generally,
no particular reliance need be shown for the affirmations of fact made during the bargain,
since they are regarded as part of the description of goods. It has been thought that the
reliance requirement must be determined according to the characteristic of each case and
the real life experiences. Since it is not always the case that the buyer's knowledge is less
than the seller or sometimes buyer may realize the false or misleading statements of the
seller. In these situations, reliance must not be sought.
As for the statements made by the seller prior to the bargaining process it was
stated by a scholar that "it is unreasonable to presume that the buyer relied on those
affirmations and the buyer has to prove the actual reliance." If the seller made the
statements regarding the goods in the course of the bargaining process, under section 2-
313 of the UCC, it would be highly reasonable to presume the buyer's reliance on those
"** See for the discussion ofdifferent views Adler. supra note 5 1 , at 439-42.
^'* See Adler. supra note 51, at 439-40; see also White & Summers, supra note 10, § 9-5, at 352-53.
™ Cf. White & Summers, supra note 10, at 353-54.
' See e.g. Charles A. Heckman, Reliance or Common Honesty ofSpeech: The History and Interpretation of
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 38, CASE W. RES. L. R£V.l, 39 (1987).
See Hodaszy, supra note 52, at 470.
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Statements and buyer has no burden of proving the reliance on those statements of the
seller. If the seller made the statements after the bargaining process those statements
could bind the seller since buyer has reliance on the goods. On this prong, although the
seller's statements regarding the goods have no effect on the buyer's decision on
purchasing the goods and those statements can create an express warranty.
Some courts have interpreted and decided to eliminate the reliance requirement
for express warranties.^' Briefly in those decisions the views of the courts were "if there
was an affirmation of fact which was the part of the basis of the bargain, there was no
independent reliance requirement as to that affirmation of fact. "'^ While some cases were
relying on the comment 3 of the section 2-313, some cases were denying the existence of
the reliance requirement. On the other hand, some other cases insist that reliance is still
required.^^ Their ground for the denial was the expanded notion of bargain.^* In Autzen v.
John C. Taylor Lumber Sales^' the decision was based on the expanded notion of
bargain,'** which means.
"a bargain is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is
forever fixed as to its content and it is a continuing commercial relationship
between the parties with regard to the product in question, the bargain between
plaintiff and defendant was still in process at the time of the survey, even though
the sales agreement already had been reached."^^
See e.g. Winston Indus, v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co.. 55 Ala. App. 525. 530 (1975); Young & Cooper. Inc., v.
Vestnng. 2 1 4 Kan. 3 1 1 , 324 ( 1 974); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical. 99 N.M. 645. 65 1 ( 1 983 ).
See Hodaszy. supra note 52. at 477.
'- See e.g. Royal Typewnter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies. 719 F.2d 1092. 1101(11'^ Cir. 1983); Royal
Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp.. 633 F.2de 34, 44 (7'" Cir. 1980); Stuto v. Coming Glass Works. 1990
WL 105615. 5 (D. Mass. 1990)
''^
Cf. Hodaszy. supra note 52. at 477.
^' Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales. 280 Or. 783 (1977).
''^
See Id., at 789.(bargain was described as an ongoing commercial relationship between parties, not
discrete event.)
^"^ Robert Nordstrom. Law of Sales 206 (1970).
In this regard, according to that view, the buyer can rely on the statements after
the conclusion of the agreement, because the relationship is a continuous one.
In Cipollonne v. Liggett Group, Inc./° it was indicated that "a buyer must have
been aware of a seller's advertisement at the time of purchase and actually must have
believed those affirmations at that time to create an express warranty."^' However, as a
counter argument "the defendant could rebut such a presumption through clear
affirmative proof that the buyer knew that the affirmation of fact or promise was
untrue."*' Therefore, no reliance exists and no express warranty is created. For the
purposes of the creation of an express warranty the purchaser's knowledge that a
statement is false precludes the statement from being held a warranty. •* When the
purchaser and the seller know that a statement is false it cannot be regarded as an express
warranty, because there is no reliance.
In order to create an express warranty, "a seller's statement must be one which is
reasonably understood by the buyer as an affirmation of fact regarding the product to be
purchased."**^ In Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp.,''' it was stated that "to
become express warranty, seller's statement should be one factor leading buyer to
purchase good."**^ This is a kind of presumption that the buyer relied on the statements of
the buyer during the course of the bargain. In this regard, the buyer has no burden to
prove the reliance, since it is a reasonable presumption that the buyer relied on the
affirmations of fact of the seller. Comment 3 to section 2-313 indicates precisely that
*" CipoUone v. Liggett Group. Inc.. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
**' Generally see CipoUone v. Liggett Group. Inc..
*' See Hodaszy supra note 52. at 48 1
.
^^ See e.g. Royal Business Machines, Inc.. v. Lorraine Corp. 633 F.2d 34 (1980).
^ See Hodaszy supra note 52, at 486.
**' See Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34. 44 ( 1980).
*'*' See Lorraine Corp. .633 F.2d. at 44.
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"seller's affirmations made during the bargaining process are regarded as part of the
description of those goods, hence no particular reliance on such statements need be
shown.'"*' As stated in the comment that the affirmations made during the bargain are
regarded as part of the description of the goods and there is a presumption that buyer
have relied on those statements and therefore, a burden of prove regarding the reliance
was eliminated.
According to comment 7 of the section 2-313 states that post-bargaining or post-
formation statements by the seller can become express warranties. Nevertheless, some
courts have ignored the explicit language of the comment 7 and they have held that
"those statements after the deal cannot become express warranties since the buyer could
have relied on them."*** Some other courts have held that post-formation affirmations can
become express warranties.'*'^ Since comment 7 of the section 2-313 supports the
expansive interpretation namely the expanded notion of bargain through ratifying the
existence of post-sale warranties. ** In comment 7 it was stated that the precise time
regarding the seller's representation of the products is irrelevant and the post-bargaining
representations may create the express warranties. Comment 7 of the section, besides
indicating those mentioned above, points out that "if the statement is made after the
closing of the deal, it may operate as a modification of the contract under Section 2-209
of the Code."""
•^'U.C.C. 2-313 cmt. 3(1999).
**'*5ee e.g. Flory v. Silvercrest, Indus., 633 P. 2d 383, 390 (Anz. 1981) it was stated that "post-bargaining
affirmations cannot become express warranties because of lack of reliance."; Byrd Motor Lines v. Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp.. 304 S.E. 2d 773, 778 (1983).
^'^ See e.g. Downie v. Abex Corp.. 741 F.2d 1235, 1240 (lO"" Cir.1984) it was generally indicated that post-
bargainmg affirmations can become express warranties under comment 7; Bigelow v. Agway. 506 F.2d
55K555('2dCir. 1974).
*' Cf Special Project, supra note 3 1 . at 1 1 80.
"' See 1 McDonnell & Coleman. 5u/7ra note 30. § 5.02[2] [c] [ii], at 5-16.
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The other aspect of the rehance of the buyer on the seller's statements is the prior
knowledge of the buyer that the statements of the sellers are false at the time he made his
purchase decision. In this case the affirmation of fact of the seller cannot create an
express warranty, since the buyer does not rely on the statements of the seller. In other
words, the affirmation of fact of the seller is not a part of the basis of the bargain. In this
case, "the buyer has to prove the reliance on the affirmation of fact made by the seller to
the general public at any time prior to the period during a bargain for that affirmation to
become an express warranty. "*'-
The reason why the affirmations of fact made prior and the during the bargaining
process are treated differently with respect to burden of proving and becoming an express
warranties is "a buyer who was aware of an affirmation about a product prior to the
bargain would not buy the product if he believed that the affirmation was false and the
product would not perform as promised."^' Briefly, a buyer can only rely on the
affirmations of the seller when he is deciding to purchase the product. This is the
presumption that reliance exists during the bargaining process and there is no need to
prove the reliance.
As a consequence, the best reading of section 2-313 that reliance need not be
shown for the affirmations of fact made during the bargain. Since a buyer at the time of
the purchase naturally will rely on the description and the affirmation of the seller.
Finally, the Code itself does not require the reliance.
"* See White & Summers, supra note 10, § 9-5. at 353.
See Hodaszy. supra note 52. at 495.
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D. WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
Subsection 2-3 1 6( 1 ) of the UCC states:
"words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."**
The purpose of this subsection is to protect buyers. Since an express warranty is
created with affirmative affumations, it is generally hard to disclaim an express warranty.
Hence, a seller who explicitly warrants or guarantees that a good is without defects may
not successfully defend a lawsuit based on a later disclaimer of express warranties.**-
According to Comment 1 of the subsection 2-316(1), "subsection 1 seeks to
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying
effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty."^ Thus,
subsection 2-316(1) seeks to protect the buyer from the unexpected and unbargained
effects of the disclaimer. If the affirmation creates an express warranty then according to
subsection 2-316(1) buyer cannot be affected from the disclaimer in the event of conflict.
In other words, in the event that there is an express warranty the disclaimer is inoperative.
The disclaimer and the warranty must be consistent with each other. Courts have the
duty to interpret the consistency between the disclaimer and the warranty.
For the negotiated deals, "where the parties have consciously chosen terms as
express warranties and have specifically limited those warranties, it is sensible to
interpret the terms as a whole and to recognize what otherwise might be described as an
'*'U.C.C.§ 2-316(1) (1999).
"
Cf. White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-2. at 425.
*U.C.C. 2-316 (Dcmt. 1 (1999).
invalid disclaimer as an enforceable qualification of the express warranty."^' Wlien the
deal is not negotiated as with "pass through" warranties, "product descriptions and other
affirmations that lay persons may not regard as express warranties are express warranties
under section 2-313.'"^^ Hence, the affirmations on the label or on the warranty package
create an express warranty. However, the affirmations on the labels are harder to
disclaim since the precise affirmation creates the express warranty and there is little
possibility to disclaim it.
One of the crucial parts of subsection 2-316(1) is the cross-reference to the parol
evidence rule. Comment 2 of the section 2-316 sets out that "reference to the parol
evidence rule is intended to protect the seller against false allegations of the oral
warranties.'"^ At this point the finality of the written agreement gains importance,
because the protection of the seller has two restrictions. If the written agreement is not
the final form, then the disclaimer on this form cannot negate the oral warranty made by
the seller previously.'*^ As the second step, if the written agreement is the final
agreement of the parties, then even here an oral warranty may supplement it. For
example in Carpetland, USA v. Payne'"', the seller's salesman orally informed the buyer
that new carpet would be installed if anything went wrong with the purchased carpet for
one year. However, the written sales agreement contained a disclaimer of all express and
implied warranties unrelated to the description of the goods. The court held that
Carpetland' s warranty disclaimer did not bar recovery under the express warranty. The
''^
See White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-3. at 427; see also Corey v. Furgat Tractor & Equip.. Inc.,
147 Vt. 477. 520 A.2d 600 (1986).
*"* White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-3. at 427.
'^ White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-4, at 428
'**
Cf. White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-4. 428.
"" Carpetland. U.S.A. v. Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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court noted that Indiana law provided that when the language of an express warrant\' and
a disclaimer are inconsistent, the disclaimer is moperative to prevent the seller from
liability. Subsection 2-316(1) "does not say that language of negation or limitation is
always inoperative, and it is inoperative only when it cannot reasonably be construed to
be inconsistent with the language of affirmation. "'°- In this connection if the language of
the oral warranty and the written disclaimer is inconsistent with each other then the oral
warranty prevails and the buyer is protected.
A disclaimer can be made by persons different from the warrantor and is common
with "pass through" warranties where the affirmation is made by the manufacturer and
the negation or disclaimer is made by the dealer. In this case, "a total disclaimer of
express warranty by a dealer can be upheld under subsection 2-316(1) even though the
manufacturer is simultaneously giving an express warranty.'""^ In that situation, the
disclaimer of the dealer has been upheld by some courts. '°^
After all those arguments, it does not appear that 2-316(1) compels the
invalidation of a general express warranty disclaimer when it is obvious that the buyer
has agreed to the disclaimer provision merely because there have been earlier statements
apart from the formal written contract by the seller that'^-^
"'-
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[1], at 5-78.
'°^
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 5.08[3], at 5-82.
'**
Cf. 1 McDonnell & coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[3], at 5-82; see also e.g. Transurface Carriers,
Inc., V. Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42 (l" Cir. 1984). Witkowski v. Mack Trucks, Inc.. 712 F.2d 1352 (7"'
Cir. 1983). Hindling v. Kline-Volvo, Inc.. 1996 W.L. 208500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), Troutt v. Nash
AMC Jeep. Inc. 157 Ga. App. 399. 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981).
"" See 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[5], at 5-93.
"* See 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[5], at 5-93.
E. WARRANTY LIMITATIONS
The purpose of the section 2-719 is to grant the buyer a remedy which can be in
the form of repair or replacement, when the goods do not conform to the bargain without
subjecting the seller to an unknown risk. The unknown risk can be the consequential
damages. Section 2-719 of the UCC governs the warranty limitations of express
warranties. As a general rule "contract terms are negotiated between the parties."'"^ In
other words, the parties may agree to remedies and control damages as they see fit.
Every sales contract has two places for the remedies to be looked for. One of them is the
provisions of the contract and the other is the provisions of UCC article 2. Furthermore,
"it is the essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be
available."'"* According to subsection 2-719(l)(a) a buyer's remedy may be limited to
repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts or return of the price. In the
event the contract between the seller and the buyer declares that buyer has those rights,
then buyer must give the opportunity to the seller to repair the non-conforming part of the
good. In this context, "there will be no breach if the warrantor makes or pays for the
repairs."'** According to Comment 1 of section 2-719, parties have the freedom to
choose and draft the type of their remedies on the contract. This is consistent with the
concept of freedom of contract. However, contract terms related to the limitation or
exclusion of the consequential damages are subject to judicial scrutiny under the
unconscionability standard."" In this context "a buyer who wants to overcome the
'"^
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 7.02[2], at 7-4.
"'*'U.C.C. § 2-719. cmt. 1 ( 1999); see also e.g. Polycon Indus.. Inc.. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F.Supp. 1316,
1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
'"^
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 7.02[2]. at 7-4.
"V/: White & Summers, 5Wjpra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
29
limitation of the remedy clause may prove that the clause was not expressly agreed to be
exclusive.'"" Subsection 2-719(l)(b) requires that the stipulated remedy be regarded as
optional, because there is also a remedy option in the article 2 itself. "Comment 2 of the
subsection (l)(b) creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative
rather than exclusive, but the seller can rebut that presumption.""" In Ford Motor
Company v. Reid"^ the court concluded that the clause in the contract did not expressly
state that the remedy of repair or replacement was exclusive. In this regard, the clauses
regarding the remedies must be clear, in order not to leave any unanswered question.
According to subsection 2-719(2) "even if a contract contains a perfectly drafted
clause that explicitly states the exclusive remedy, the buyer can still resort to subsection
(2) to avoid the effect of that clause.""'' In order to do that the buyer has to establish that
the exclusive remedy provided in the contract fails of its essential purpose and therefore
he can disregard that contract term and can return to the other possibilities for recourse.
Shortly, subsection 2-719(2) should apply when the remedy fails it essential purpose.
Subsection 2-719(2) generally applies when under the limited repair and replacement
remedy, seller is reluctant or unable to repair the defective good within a reasonable time.
In that case, the remedy fails of its essential purpose. In all of these circumstances the
buyer must allow a reasonable opportunity and time to the seller to repair and replace the
defective goods. Before that, a buyer cannot argue that the remedy fails of its essential
purpose.
"' White & Summers. 5w/7ra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
"" White & Summers, 5Wjpra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
" See Ford Motor Company v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176. 465 S.W.2d 80 ( 1971 ).
"''
White & Summers. 5Wjpra note 10, § 12-10. at 449.
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Generally, a buyer of equipment, vehicle or other kind of good expects from the
seller that her new product be repaired or replaced. However, in the contract the seller
may have limited its liability. In this context, "even if a seller interprets the promise to be
merely a promise to use its best efforts to make the product like new, that is not a
reasonable interpretation of the promise to a consumer.""' Exclusive remedies are the
repair and replacement or promises of refunds of the purchase price. In practice, "in the
contracts, they are accompanied by the clauses that deny liability for consequential
damages.'""'
Section 2-719(3) reads:
"Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
Many courts treat the exclusion of consequential damages as separate and
independent from an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement. In their view, the
exclusion of consequential damages stands so long as it is not unconscionable even where
there has been a failure of repair. Most of the rulings, which have invalidated the
exclusion of consequential damages concern cases where farmers have suffered large
crop cases.
"^
" See White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-10 [b], at 453.
""Sfe White & Summers, .supra note 10, § 12-10 [c], at 454.
"
'
See generally 1 McDONNELL &COLEMAN, supra note 30, §§ 7-8.
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F. NOTICE OF BREACH
In order to be entitled to a remedy, a buyer, who accepts the non-conforming
goods, must notify the seller that the goods are non-conforming. Otherwise, the buyer
will be barred from any remedy.
Subsection 2-607(3 )(a) provides that:
"Where a tender has been accepted
(a) [T]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."
The remedy mentioned in the subsection includes right to revoke acceptance and
the right to damages. The reasonable time requirement has great importance. Although
the reasonable time within which the buyer should have discovered the breach and have
notified the seller differs from authority to authority and case to case there are four
policies behind 2-607.
"According to first policy, the notice requirement is required to enable the seller
to make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure to the
end of minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the
buyer....Second policy is to afford sellers an opportunity to arm themselves for
negotiation and litigation... Third policy is to cut off a claimant who does not
promptly give notice of a defect.... Final policy behind the notice requirement is
to give defendants that same kind of mind balm they get from the statute of
limitations."'"
According to comment 4 of section 2-607, the notice requirement defeats the
commercial bad faith of the buyer. Pursuant to that comment "in cases resting mostly on
the first policy, the courts are not at all hesitant to find that commercial buyers failed to
live up to the notice requirements and thus forfeited their Code remedies.""'^
'" White & Summers, .vupra note 10. § 11-10. at 418.
"'' White & Summers, supra note 10. § 1 1-10. at 418; see also where notices were untimely Hapag Lloyd
A.G. V. Marine Indem. Ins. Co., 576 So.2d, 1330 (Fla. App. 1991 ); P & F Constr. Corp., v. Fnend Lumber
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One step further, whether anyone other than the buyer has to give notice of breach
and whether a buyer must give notice to any seller other than the one from whom he
actually purchased the goods are the crucial points. The requirement of the UCC section
2-607 (3)(a) that a buyer give timely notice to a seller of any breach in accepted goods
that prove defective is different in the non-privity context. On this issue courts have
different views. In this context on one hand, "the courts have nearly unanimously agreed
that notice is not required from third party beneficiaries.'"'" On the other hand, however,
"in recent cases courts indicate that a non-privity consumer buyer must timely notify a
remote manufacturer of alleged defects, at least when the buyer seeks recover}' under the
Code for economic loss.'"''
In short, one can say that the language of section 2-607(3)(a) indicates that the
term "buyer" means the person who buys the goods directly from the manufacturer.
Therefore, the remote purchaser should not be held liable for the notification of the defect
to the manufacturer.
G. PRIVITY ISSUES
Privity is "the name of a legal relation arising from right and obligation.'"" From
that statement it can be deduced that if the right and obligation exist, the party is in
Corp. 31 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 575 N.E.2d61 (1991); Amcast Indus. Corp.. v. Detrex Corp. 779 F. Supp.
1519 (N.D. Ind. 1991), affdin part, rev din part, 2F.3d 746 (7'" Cir. 1993).
Since in the pnvity context the timely notice of breach is compulsory for the buyer of the good, which
serves for the legitimate purposes, see Harry G. Pnnce, Cherprotecling The Consumer'^ Section 2-607(3)(a)
Notice of Breach In Non-Privity Contexts. 66 N. C. L. Rev. 107. at 135 (1987); see also WHITE &
Summers, supra note 10. § 1 1-10. at 421.
'^' St^f White & Summers. 5z/;?ra note 10. § 11-10, at 421.
'" This was the statement of Justice Stone in La Mourea v. Rhude. 295 N.W. 304, 307 (Minn. 1940),
"Privity, in the law of contracts, is merely the name for a legal relation arising from right and obligation."
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privity.'^ In the past, formal privity was given strong consideration in express
warranties. In other words "traditionally manufacturers owe no duty of care to people not
in privity.'""'' The traditional doctrine stems from Winterbottom v. Wright''- whose
philosophy is that only those buyers in privity with the manufacturer can recover from
manufacturer for defective products which cause harm. However, one can say that the
philosophy of this doctrine is declining.
Present article 2 says little about privity. In other words, within the scope of the
article privity was not covered thoroughly. At the time of the drafting of section 2-318
"there was no national consensus on the proper scope of warranty protection.""'^ In this
cormection, "Karl Llewellyn initially drafted the section to restrict severely the effect of
both horizontal and vertical privity rules."'-' Section 2-318 gives the states three
alternatives for the extension of warranties to persons other than the immediate buyer
Alternatives A and B were adopted by most states, limited the extension to non-
contracting individuals who were injured in person by breach of the warranty; Alternative
C was adopted in few states, and extended the warranty vertically. "In all cases, the
theory of extension was analogous to a third party beneficiary contract under which the
beneficiary's rights were determined by the contract between the seller and the immediate
buyer.'"-'
Alternative A provides:
'-^
Cf. John E. Murray, The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism. 35 Wm. &. MaRY L. R£V. 1447,
1494(1994).
'-' See Special Project supra note 3 1 , at 1310.
'-- Winterbottom v. Wnght. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
'J^
See 2 W. Hawkland. Uniform Commercial code Series § 2-3 1 8:0 1 . at 42 1 -22 ( 1 984).
'- See Hawkland. supra note 126. at 423.
I '*H
See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2: Highlights ofthe Proposed Revisions: Contract Formation. Consumer
Protection. Warranties. S.D. 30 AL1-.A.BA 407. at 426.
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"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section."'-'^
According to commentators, authorizing a "legislative choice of limits furthers
common law erosion of the horizontal privity doctrine while allowing courts to develop
their own rules on vertical privity.'"^" According to the comment 2 of section 2-318
Alternative A "is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law
on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain."''' Therefore one can say that 2-318 is neutral on the issue and
the privity issue is left to legislature and the courts. To this end, the courts may develop
their own horizontal and vertical privity doctrines without being bound to any section.
As one commentator states "the drafters intended the initial version of section 2-318 to
codify contemporary case law on horizontal privity while remaining neutral regarding
further limitations on the privity doctrines.'"^-
Altemative B provides:
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
'" U.C.C. § 2-3 18 .Mtemative A (1999), Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana. Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan Mississippi. Missoun, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico. North Carolina, Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon, Pennsylvania. Tennessee. Washington,
west Virginia. Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have generally adopted the Alternative A.
' See Special Project, supra note 3 1 , at 1314.
'' U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 2 (1999). Comment 2 reads "The purpose of this section is to give certain
beneficiaries the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby
freeing any such beneficianes from any technical rules as to privity. It seeks to accomplish this purpose
without any derogation of any pnmanly upon the merchant seller's warranty under this Article that the
goods sold are merchantable and fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods sold are used rather
than the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Implicit in the section is that any beneficiary of a
warranty may bnng a direct action for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to
him."
'"'" See 2 H.AWKLAND. supra note 126, § 2-318:01, at 424.
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who is injured by breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section." '"
Alternative C provides:
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the
warranty extends.'"^*
The neutrality of the comments and the courts intervening and shaping the scope
of the section is well explained in Spring Motors'^\ which states "the drafters of the
U.C.C. have left it to the courts to determine whether vertical privity should be required
in a warranty action between a seller and a remote buyer.'"^*
H. CONTRACTUAL CHARACTERISTICOF EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Express warranties have a contractual characteristic. "Although warranty's
beginnings were in tort, emerging from causes sounding in fraud or deceit, warranty
shifted to become a part of the basic contract law on the idea that the parties could
bargain for the express warranties as a part of the price of the product.'"" In this
connection, "a fundamental principle of contract law is that warranty and other contract
terms may be negotiated between the parties. '"^^ In this context, "express warranties
consist of those statements (oral or written) and actions that seller manifests in relation to
the goods and are enforced for the buyer by the law and they depend on the voluntary
U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative B (1999)Alabama. Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and the Virgin Islands have adopted this alternative.
U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative C (1999) Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming
have adopted this alternative.
'^- Spnng Motors v. Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
"^ See Id. Spring Molars. 98 N.J. at 587, 489 A.2d, at 676.
See D. Brit Nelson. Is Privity- Still Required In a Breach ofExpress Warranty Cause ofAction For
Personal Injury Damages!'. 43 BAYLOR L. Rev. 551, at 553 (1991).
'^'
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 7.02[1]. at 7-3.
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conduct of the seller.'-'*" Furthermore, '"express warranties depend upon the parties'
deliberate actions and are sound in contract in origin; also express warranties are fixed to
the individual transaction because they are personal to the bargain.'"*" As mentioned in
the Dravo v. German'"' case "express warranties are created by the express
representations of the seller.'""- In other words the seller is determining the scope of his
warranty. The seller may make a warranty as broad or as narrow within the scope of the
law. In Cippollone v. Liggett Group'"^ case the court stated that "a manufacturer's
liability for breach of express warranties derives from, and is measured by, the terms of
the warranty and the requirements imposed by an express warranty claim are not imposed
under State law, but rather imposed by the warrantor.'"^
As a consequence, express warranties have a contractual characteristic. It is
consistent with the face-to-face characteristic of the UCC article 2. Each party has the
opportunity to express its view and concerns and within the scope of the concept of
freedom of contract they negotiate over the terms of the warranty protection. Therefore,
the mutual consent of the parties is established.
I. QUESTION OF REMEDIES
For the measurement of the damages four general principles have been foreseen in
the Uniform Commercial Code. Those are:
'""* See DOUGL.^S J. WhaLEY. WaRR.ANTIES and the PR.ACTITI0NER 21 ( 1 98 1 ).
"* See Whaley, Id., at 2 1 -2; see also Collins Co. v. Carboline Co.. 1 25 111.2d 498. 532 N.E.2d 834, 838
(1988) which also states that express warranties have a contractual character.
"" Dravo v. German. 73 Or. App. 165. (1985).
'"*' See German. 13 Or. App., at 169.
"" Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
"" See Liggett Group. Inc..505 U.S.. at 506.
37
(a) "The court should attempt to place the aggrieved party in the same
position as performance would have placed him."'"-
(b) "The court should require the parties to mitigate damages where
possible."'^
(c) "The court, where consistent with public and statutory policies, should
respect the intentions of the parties.'""^
(d) "Common sense, commercial practicality and Code policies should guide
the court.""^
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the buyer has two choices to pursue
against the seller or sometimes the manufacturer. Those are:
(a) To reject the goods or to revoke the acceptance of them (2-608), or
(b) To keep the goods and to sue the seller for damages for breach of
warranties (2-71 1(3)).
In the first choice of the buyer the contract is canceled and the purchase price is
recovered mostly through a lawsuit, and in the second choice of the buyer, buyer accepts
'''^
U.C.C. 1-106 (1) the remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by
other rule of law; see also Special Project, supra note 31. at 1220; see Whaley, supra note 139, at 149.
''**' The Act makes it clear that damages must be minimized § 1-106 comment 1; § 1-203 obligation of good
faith in performance and enforcement; § 2-706 (1) seller's remedy of resale when buyer breaches; § 2-712
(2) formula for damages when buyer covers after seller's breach; see also Special Project, supra note 31, at
1220.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (2) 'underlying purposes and policies of this Act are to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties"; see also Special Project,
supra note 31, at 1220.
^^^
'This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions" § 1-102 "It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied m this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. This Act should be
construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read
in the light of the Act as a whole and should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in
conformity with the purposes and policies involved." § 1-102 cmt. 1; see also Special Project, supra note
31, at 1220.
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the goods however, sues the seller. In his both choices the buyer is entitled to incidental
and the consequential damages through section 2-715 of the UCC.
At this point it is crucial to give information regarding the economic loss, which
comprises both direct economic loss and consequential economic loss. According to that:
"Direct economic loss may be said to encompass damage on insufficient product
value; thus, the direct economic loss may be out of pocket ~ the difference in
value of what is given and received ~ or loss of bargain ~ the difference between
the value of what is received and its value as represented. Direct economic loss
may also be measured by costs of replacement and repair. Consequential
economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as loss of profits resulting from
inability to make use of the defective product.'"^'*
In general terms, "where the buyer retains the goods, damages are to be measured
in terms of the difference at acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and their
value as warranted unless special circumstances exist.""" After the rejection or
revocation of acceptance the buyer can cancel the contract and he is "entitled to so much
of the price as has been paid.'"'' Furthermore under sections 2-712 and 2-713, "the
revoking or rejecting buyer may be entitled to receive damages based on a cover
transaction or market price from the seller.'"" Therefore, it can be said that the measure
of the damages is different for the revocation or the rejection of the goods than retaining
the goods. Section 2-714 applies in the case of acceptance of the goods. Therefore it is
inappropriate to apply section 2-714 when there is revocation or rejection. '•
If the goods are returned to the seller after the rejection or the revocation,
damages can be demanded through sections 2-71 1, 2-712, and 2-713. ""' If the buyer
'*" See Note. Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV.. 917. 918 (1966).
"° 3 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 25-02[2] at 25-6.
'" 3 McDonnell & Coleman supra note 30. § 25-03[l] at 25-6.
''- 3 McDonnell & Coleman supra note 30, § 25-03[ 1] at 25-7.
'-''
Cf. 3 McDonnell & Coleman 5Ujpra note 30. § 25-03[l] at 25-7.
''"
Cf. 3 McDonnell & COLEum supra note 30, § 25-03[l] at 25-7.
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keeps the goods, the damages can be demanded through section 2-714.'" However, "at
the same time the buyer has the abiHty for the purchase price of the accepted good under
section 2-709.'""' As was mentioned, the buyer will be entitled to incidental and
consequential damages under the section 2-715 of the UCC regardless of whether he
chooses either of the choices.
According to another explanation "buyer's damages can be gathered under two
categories as primary and resultant damages."''^ However, they are different from the
common law concepts of direct and special damages, which the Code rejects.''** Primary
damages are the damages which "a buyer suffers to the extent that the goods he receives
are not as promised.'"-" The resultant damages are "any other damages that the buyer
suffers including property damages, personal injuries, lost profits, etc. and section 2-
714(3) allows recovery for resultant damages in a proper case as determined under
section 2-715.""* The measurement of the primary damages is provided in section 2-714
(2). In the event the buyer accepts and retains the non-conforming goods this section
applies. According to the section 2-714(2):
"[T]he measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount.""''
'-"'
Cf 3 McDonnell & Coleman 5M/7ra note 30, § 25-03[I] at 25-7.
'-'''
3 McDonnell & Coleman 5w/?ra note 30. § 25-03[l], at 25-8.
'' See Special Project, supra note 31. at 1220.
'"''**
Cf Special Project, supra note 31. at 1220.
''" See Special Project, supra note 3 1 . at 1 220.
"^' See Special Project, supra note 3 1 . at 1 220-2 1
.
"' U.C.C. §2-714 (2) (1999).
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From this definition "courts often use either the cost of repair or independent
indicia of value to determine the difference between the value of the goods as warranted
and as delivered."'"
Cost of repair is a type of way to measure the difference between the value of the
goods as warranted and as received. "Courts use the cost of repair as the measure of
primary damages in cases in which the goods can be brought into conformity with their
warranties at a reasonable cost,"'^' In the section 2-714(2) it is provided that recovery
should be the amount of the difference between the value of the defective goods as
accepted and the value of the goods as warranted. Thus, "if the cost of repair exceeds the
value of the goods as warranted repair costs could not represent the proper recovery
amount.""^
Some courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover repair damages even though the
cost of repair exceeds the purchase price.'*"- On the other hand, some courts apply the
theory that limits the buyer's recovery to purchase price.'*"* It has been thought that in the
cost of repairs type of recovery allowing the plaintiff to recover the damages even though
the cost of the repair exceeds the purchase price is better and it protects the buyer who
bought the defective goods. Since "the contract price and value as warranted are not
always equivalent and a difference between the contract price and the value as warranted
'*"" See Special Project, supra note 31. at 1221.
'*' See Special Project, supra note 3 1 , at 1 22 1
.
*** See Special Project, supra note 3 1. at 1222.
'"• See e.g. Continental Sand & Gravel, Inc., v. K & K Sand & Gravel. Inc.. 755 F.2d 87 (7'^ Cir. 1985).
"The court found this result logical because capping damages at the purchase pnce would clearly depnve
the purchaser of the benefit of its bargain in cases in which the value of the goods as warranted exceeds that
pnce."; ."iee also Special Project, supra note 31, at 1222.
"" See e.g. Richardson v. Car Lot Co.. 462 N.E.2d 459.462 ( 1983).
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is often attributable to section 2-714(2)'s requirement that courts measure the value as
warranted on the date of acceptance of the goods rather than on the contract date.""'^
Another view regarding the repair was mentioned in Cundy v. International
Trencher Service"^ case. In the said case the main thesis was "repairs to bring the goods
into conformity with the contract also might improve or extend the life of the goods
beyond what was originally warranted.'"*''^ However, contrary to that case a Texas court
in Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co.'^" case decided to "allocate the cost of
improvement in value to the buyer.'" ^'
When the defective goods cannot be repaired or the cost of repair is an
inappropriate measure of the buyer's primary damages, independent indicia of value is
the appropriate way to determine the damages.'^" In the independent indicia of value
"buyer must independently prove the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted. '"^^ There are two types of value. One of
them is 'value as warranted' and the other is 'value as accepted'.
From the language of the section 2-714 (2) value as warranted cannot be defined.
According to the section 2-714 the courts must determine the value. "The difference in
value must be the value at the time of the acceptance." '^'' As for the value as accepted,
"fair market value as accepted provides the best measure of the value of defective goods
as accepted. '"^^ However, due to the difficulty in the measurement of the fair value of
" See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1222.
"* Cundy v. International Trencher Service. 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1984).
"^ See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1223.
'™ Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.!973).
'^' For the argument see Special Project. .9M/7ro note 3 1 , at 1223.
' " Cf. Special Project, supra note 31, at 1223.
See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1223.
'
"* See Special Project, supra note 3 1 , at 1 224.
See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1225.
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defective goods at the time of the acceptance some courts in their decisions'^'' use the
resale price as the approximation. '^'
In addition to the recovery of the proximate damages through the primary
damages, a buyer can receive resultant damages, which is set forth in section 2-715 via
the reference of section 2-714(3). Resultant damages are the incidental and the
consequential damages. According to the section 2-715:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
The incidental damages are appropriate when the buyer revokes the acceptance or
rejects the goods. "A buyer who justifiably rejects the non-conforming goods may
recover, as incidental damages, the costs of inspecting the goods in addition to storage
and transportation expenses.'" ** In order to be entitled to a recovery of incidental
damages, the damages must be incident to breach and they must be reasonable.
' See e.g. Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1 197, 1203 (8'*' Cir.1984).
Cf. Special Project, supra note 3 1 , at 1 225.
See Special Project, supra note 31. at 1232.
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According to section 2-715 (2) consequential damages are available to a buyer
who experienced a breach of warranty. "A buyer who receives non-conforming goods
often sustains losses peculiar to his situation that are not solely attributable to the non-
conformity, and therefore the UCC recognizes the consequential damages when
appropriate.'"^"
The suffered loss, the seller's breach which causes the suffered loss, and the
situation that the seller could have foreseen the consequence of such breach should be
proven by the buyer in order to recover the consequential damages.
'
'* See Special Project, supra note 3 1 , at 1 236.
CHAPTER III
"PASS THROUGH" WARRANTIES
A. REGULATION UNDER CURRENT ARTICLE 2
The present article 2 does not expressly address ''pass through" warranties. As
noted in the introduction part the focus of the drafters of the express warranty provisions
seems to have been on direct negotiated contracts. Some scholars have expressed the
view that article 2 does not apply to "pass through" warranties, due to the reason that "the
legal relationship between the manufacturers and the remote manufacturers and the
remote buyers has not been brought under the article 2.'"*° Furthermore, they state that
"current Article 2 does not literally apply to the ubiquitous manufacturers' warranty even
in cases involving only economic loss."'*'
However, if one examines the cases, he will find that the courts uniformly treat
"pass through" warranties as express warranties allowing buyer's to bring their claim for
breach of the standby commitment under section 2-313."*- Whatever the jurisdiction's
position may be on the issue of privity of contract in general, no decision refuses
enforcement to "pass through" warranties on grounds of lack of privity. The decisions
"*" See Curtis R. Reitz. Manufacturers' Warranties of Consumer Goods. 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 360
(1997)
"*' See e.g. Donald F. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase. Two
Relationships. 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 413 (1997).
'"* See e.g. Mainline Tractor w Nutrite Corp.. 937 F.Supp. 1095 (1996), in which the court held that
representations on label and label packets had been express warranties and "the statement on the label
clearly falls within the puniew of section 2-3 13(a) as an affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer
relating to the quality of the goods." 937 F.Supp. at 1 106.
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employ one of two analytical approaches to allow the ultimate buyer to issue the
contractually remote warranty.
Some courts conclude that by intentionally directing the "pass through" warranty
to the ultimate buyer, the warranty joins the ultimate sales contract for purposes of
providing the warranty for the transaction. Under their analysis, a type of privity is said
to exist between the warrantor sending the "pass through" and ultimate buyer. Opinions
from Georgia and Vermont illustrate this analysis.
In Chrysler v. Wilson Plumbing Co.,^^^ the Georgia Court has held that "where an
automobile manufacturer, through its dealer issues to a purchaser of one of its
automobiles from such dealer admittedly as a part of the sale a warranty by the
manufacturer running to the purchaser, privity exists."'*^ \n Jones v. Cranman 's Sporting
Goods^^\ the Georgia Court found this principle applicable to the situation where "the
weapon was fully guaranteed by the distributor to the ultimate consumer.""*" In Ford
Motor Co.. V. Lee^^^ the Georgia court has held that "a manufacturer who sells or releases
a vehicle into the stream of commerce, knowing that it is likely to be resold or used by
others than the buyer, will be held liable for an injury caused by a defect which might be
discovered by reasonable inspection by the manufacturer.""** In Gochey v.
'*-' Chrysler Corp.. v. Wilson Plumbing. Co.. 132 Ga. App. 435. 208 S.E.2d 32 1 (1974).
See Wilson Plumbing. Co., 132 Ga. App. at 437, 208 S.E.2d at 323. see also Studebaker Corp., v. Nail,
82 Ga. App. 779, 784, 62 S.E.2d 198.
'** See Jones v. Cranman's Sporting Goods, 142 Ga. App. 838, 237 S.E.2d 402 ( 1 977).
"**" See Cranman S Sporting Goods. 142 Ga. App. 838, 843, 237 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1977).
"*' See Ford Motor Co., v. Lee. 1 37 Ga. App. 486. 224 S.E.2d 1 68 ( 1 976).
' See Lee. 137 Ga. App. at 487. 224 S.E.2d 170; see also. Washbum Storage Co., v. General Motors
Corp., 90 Ga. App. 380(3), 83 S.E.2d 26; Gnffith v. Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors Corp.,
105 Ga. App. 588(1), 125 S.E.2d 525; J.C. Lewis Motor Co.. v. Simmons, 128 Ga. App. 113. 114. 195
S.E.2d78I.
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Bombardier^^'^, the Vermont Supreme Court held that "when a manufacturer expressly
warrants its goods, it. in effect, creates a direct contract with the ultimate buyer."''*
The second analytical approach to allowing ultimate buyers to sue on "pass
through" warranties is to conclude simply that privity is not required in this context. To
allow a warrantor to defend on this ground would be to allow the warrantor to mislead.
In Whitman v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.,'^' the court held that, where the plaintiff
relied on a label when purchasing the good, "privity of contract was not required to
recover for injuries caused by breach of an express warranty and the label was obviously
directed toward the prospective purchasers and users of the ladder and defendant should
have known that they might rely on."'"- In this connection, a remote purchaser relies on
the statements of the manufacturer, which are printed on the label of the product or are
written in the warranty booklet, or owner's manual. Reliance takes place at the time of
the purchase of the product. The remote purchaser becomes aware of the warranty at the
time when she buys the good and opens the box of the good. In the case of the "pass
through" warranties printed on the label remote purchasers become aware of the warranty
at the time of the purchase. In any case, there is a clear reliance on the representations of
the manufacturer. Therefore, they all create express warranty. The statements of the
manufacturer become part of the basis of the bargain. Since the statements are related to
the quality of the goods, the statements induce the buyers.
During the drafting process of the UCC Karl Llewellyn was aware of the "pass
through" warranties and their effect in the market. In the Uniform Revised Sales Act
'"""SffGochey v. Bombardier. Inc.. 153 Vt. 607, 572 A.2d 921 (1990).
^'^ Bombardier. Inc.. 153 Vt. 613.
"" See Whitman v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.. 637 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
See Consolidated Aluminum Corp.. 637 S.W.2d at 407.
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(URSA), which was drafted during the first half of the 1940s, this situation was indicated
by him in the comments. In the comment to section 37 of the URSA, the importance and
the effect of the "pass through" warranties were presented with the sample cases.
'''^
Furthermore, the same comment mentioned that the section did not constitute any
approval of the view judicially expressed that warranties are in their nature confined to
the direct parties to such a contract. Therefore, before the drafting of the UCC the
importance of the "pass through" warranties was brought into consideration in the
comment to section 37 of URSA. Despite that fact "pass through" warranties were not
expressly covered in the present article 2, in this connection, leaves us with contract
limitation.
The issue of the effectiveness of a remote seller's disclaimer of or limitation on
express warranties made under sections 2-316 and 2-719 of the UCC against an ultimate
purchaser who did not have the opportunity to negotiate over the terms of the agreement
was raised by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Spring Motors v. Ford '''" According
to one view "those provisions should be enforced in the non-privity context to the same
extent that they would be enforced between the parties in privity for the equity and
fairness to remote sellers."'^' On this reasoning, "when a remote seller avails itself of the
remedy limitations and risk allocation principles of the UCC, it has a statutory right to
See e.g.. Timberland Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Climax Mfg. Co.. CCA. 3d. 1932, 61 F.(2d) 391 where it was
stated that "a manufacturer has been held obligated to a purchaser from an independent intermediary where
the manufacturer makes a special guaranty to induce the purchase."; see also Ba.xter v. Ford Motor Co.,
1932, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 where it was stated that "a manufacturer has been obligated on
representations made m sales literature supplied to intermediary and relied on by the purchaser."
'** See Spnng Motors Distributors, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555. 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
See Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights ofRemote Sellers Under the UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the
Implied Warranty ofFitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the Non-privity
Context. 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 873, at 891 (1986).
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expect that those terms will be enforced by the courts."'* Another view argues that "the
manufacturers' disclaimers and limitations prima facie unenforceable when applied
against remote commercial purchasers.'"'^" One scholar states on this issue that "standard
form documents, indeed, should be seen as things, not as contracts; the choice is between
having the manufacturer pass a given risk onto the consumer, and having the
manufacturer absorb the risk and raise the price as compensation.""* Courts have been
divided between enforcing and avoiding manufacturers' exclusions in non-privity cases.
Courts, which extend manufacturers' warranties to non-privity commercial purchasers
under the UCC, face the issue of whether to extend the manufacturers' disclaimers and
limitations. If these exclusions are given affect, this will nullify the advantages granted
to remote purchasers through abolishing vertical privity requirements, on the other hand,
to deny effect might prevent a manufacmrer from limiting its liability.''^ The courts gave
theories in favor of the avoidance of the exclusions of warranties as follows. Some courts
based their decisions-"" on the lack of conspicuousness theory. The terms of the contract
must be conspicuous to the buyer otherwise there is a lack of conspicuousness. Some
courts are willing under the present article 2 to deny effectiveness to contract limitation
based on lack of conspicuousness or lack of negotiation. Other courts give effect to the
restriction in the "pass through" warranties on the ground that they are permitted by
article 2 and that a claimant who relies on the affirmations of the "pass through" must
also be bound by its limitation.
'* See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.. 548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976).
See Dean Russell, Enforcing Manufacturers ' Warranty Exclusions Against Non-privity- Commercial
Purchasers: The Need For Uniform Guidelines. 20 Ga. L. Rev. 461, at 462 (1986).
'''**
See Todd Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction. 96 HaRV. L. Rev. 1 1 73, 1209
(1983).
Cf Russell, supra note 197. at 496.
'^'See e.g Groppel Co., v. United States Gypsum Co.. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981 ).
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On the other hand, in the "pass through" warranties the provisions of the contract
are drafted without negotiation as was discussed above, and therefore, the terms are not
known thoroughly by the remote purchaser. Some other courts based their decisions""' on
the material alteration theory. According to that theory "where an informal agreement is
followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms
so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. "-°^ In the event that those
provisions do not materially alter the agreement, they will become part of the agreement
according to UCC section 2-207. However, for the material alteration or vice versa, an
express outcome of the intention of the other party is needed. This is absent in the "pass
through" warranties. Since the manufacturer and the remote purchaser do not directly
deal with each other. Some other courts based their decisions""^ on the theory of lack of
negotiation. According to that theory, parties, especially "the remote purchaser lacked an
opportunity to negotiate directly over the terms of the exclusions, and furthermore their
decision based on the freedom of contract."'"" This also shows one of the main
characteristics of the "pass through" warranties that they are not negotiated warranties.
On the other hand, theories in favor of the enforcement of the exclusions of
warranties were given as follows. Some courts based their decisions-"' on the third party
beneficiary theory, which is stemming from the section 2-318 of the UCC. According to
that theory and the decisions of the courts the exclusions of warranties are extended to the
vertical non-privity plaintiffs, even though they did not take part in the negotiation
-°' See e.g. Old Albany Estates. Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979).
- See Russell, supra note 197, at 472.
-^- See e.g. Honzons, Inc.. v. Avco Corp., 551 F.Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982).
See Russell, supra note 197. at 475.
-""' See e.g. R&L Grain Co.. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 531 F.Supp. 201 (N.D. 111. 1981).
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process. Some other courts based their decisions-'* on the legislative mandate theory,
which denotes that "section 2-316 of the UCC provides for the exclusion or modification
of warranties in certain circumstances."-"' In this connection, "by adoptmg the section 2-
316, a state legislature has specifically granted sellers the privilege of excluding
warranties in their contracts with buyers."-"^ To this end, once a remote purchaser buys
the good, the exclusions of the warranties fall automatically within the scope of the
enforcement. In other words, those exclusions are applicable and enforceable to the
remote purchasers.
B. THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
1. THE REVISION PROJECT
The UCC"'^ has been developed and continued to be revised by the two
organizations namely the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL)-'" and the American Law Institute (ALl).-" The ALI and the NCCUSL have
been working on the revision of the Article 2 since the early 1990s. In this context, "in
1990 a study group appointed by the permanent editorial board of UCC and issued a
preliminary report and a drafting committee, appointed by the NCCUSL, has begun
circulating preliminary drafts since technological and other changes in the nature and
-** See e.g. Western Equipment Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works. Inc., 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).
-"' See Russell, supra note 197. at 479-80.
- See e.g. Russell, supra note 197, at 479.
"UCC IS the main source of commercial law in the United States. The UCC and the revisions to it are
presented to the state legislatures for adoption, and the Code only becomes the law of a respective state
when It is adopted by that state's legislature. The UCC has been adopted in some form in all fifty states.
The only exception is the state of Louisiana, which has not adopted the sales and leases article of the
UCC." See Henry D. Gabriel. The Inapplicability' of the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale ofGoods as a Modelfor the Revision ofArticle Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Tul.L.REv.
1995(1998).
For detailed mformation regardmg the NCCUSL, See Gabnel. Id.
For detailed mformation regardmg the ALI. See Gabnel. supra note 209.
51
performance of sales agreements confirm the need to revise article 2."-'- In other words,
the intent and the reason of the revision are "based on the ideas that the current Code is
not reflective of current business practices, particularly in areas such as consumer
protection, warranty, products liability and third party rights in sales contracts, as well as
emerging electronic modes of contracting."-'^ Those views supplement and justify the
revision because "the pace of economic, technical and legal change is very rapid in
American society."-'^ "The current Article 2 was drafted and operates within a context of
established principles of the common law of contracts."" After a decade of efforts the
final form of the proposed revision of the Article 2 was brought on the agenda of the
NCCUSL in July 1 999. However, due to the industry opposition to some sections, it was
thought that there would be a difficulty in the uniform adoption by the states. In this
context, the July draft for the proposed revision of the Article 2 was withdrawn. After
that meeting three modifications were made on the final July draft. Those were
November 1999, December 1999, March 2000 drafts. The recent draft is the April 2000
draft, which will be discussed in 2000 ALI Annual Meeting. The hope is that the project
will be approved by ALI in 2001.
2. NEW WARRANTY SECTIONS
During the revision process most important and controversial changes have been
made in the warranties section. In the proposed revision of the article 2 the express
-' Robert A. Hillman. Sales Law in Transition. CORNELL Law Forum. 16 (November 1995).
"' See Gabnel. supra note 209, at 2001
.
'*
Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, lb LOY. L. A. L. REV. 683,
686(1993).
"The sale of goods provisions of the UCC has been in its present form since 1958. In this regard, in its
present form it does not respond to modem electronic and computer based business transactions." See
Gabnel. supra note 209, at 2003.
warranties, "pass through" and advertising were drafted in separate sections. Express
warranties, which are governing the direct relations, are placed in section 2-313. This
section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to express warranties and remedial
promises made by the seller to the immediate buyer as part of a contract for sale. The
present section deals with affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller, to the
immediate buyer, descriptions of the goods, or exhibitions of samples or models, exactly
as any other part of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. Section 2-313 A
is new and follows the case law and practice of extending a seller's obligations regarding
new goods to remote purchasers. It governs what are commonly called the "pass
through" warranties. Section 2-313 B is also new and follows the case law and the
practice in extending a seller's obligations regarding new goods to remote purchasers.
This section deals with obligations to a remote purchaser created through a medium for
communication with the public, primarily through advertising. In place to be current 2-
313, the revision will include these sections, which bring significant differences and
precise regulation to the privity issues, the concept of the basis of the bargain and the
remedial rights with regard to "pass through" and advertising warranties which have
effects on the third parties.
3. SECTION 2-313 A
The explicit treatment of "pass through" warranties is in section 2-313 A which
reads as follows:
Section 2-313 A Obligation To Remote Purchaser Created By Record
Packaged With or Accompanying Goods,
(a) In this section:
( 1 ) "Goods" means new goods and goods sold or leased as new goods
unless the transaction of purchase does not occur normal chain of distribution.
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(2) "Immediate Buyer" means a buyer that enters into a contract with
the seller.
(3) "Remote purchaser" means a person that buys or leases goods from
an immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of distribution.
(b) If a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods,
or provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise, in a
record packaged with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably expects the
record to be, and the record is, furnished to the remote purchaser, the seller has an
obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the affirmation of fact,
promise or description unless a reasonable person in the position of the remote purchaser
would not believe that the affirmation of fact, promise or description created an
obligation, and an obligation to the remote purchaser will perform the remedial promise.
(c) It is not necessary to the creation of an obligation under this section that
the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that the seller have a
specific intention to undertake an obligation, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create an obligation.
(d) The following rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation
created under this section:
( 1
)
The seller may modify or limit the remedies available to the
remote purchaser if the modification or limitation is ftimished to the remote purchaser no
later that the time of purchase or if the modification or limitation is contained in the
record that contains the affirmation of fact, promise or description.
(2) Subject to a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in breach
is liable for incidental or consequential damages under section 2-715 but the seller is not
liable for lost profits.
(3) The remote purchaser may recover as damages for breach of as
seller's obligation arising under subsection (b) the loss resulting in the ordinary course of
events as determined in any manner, which is reasonable.
(e) An obligation that is not a remedial promise is breached if the goods did
not conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or description creating the obligation
when the goods left the seller's control.
a) "OBLIGATION ' RATHER THAN "WARRANTY"
To begin with, in the proposed revision of article 2 the so-called "pass through"
warranty is named an "obligation" rather than an "express warranty". The crucial task is
to identify the change that 2-313 A will make in comparison with the treatment of "pass
through" under the current article 2.
"The recognition of the remote warranty obligation is an acknowledgment of the
modem marketing and distribution system in which the manufacturers give warranties to
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persons not in privity.""'* Furthermore, "the recognition of these remote warranties also
comes with a recognition of the remote seller's ability to limit remedies and to curtail the
extension of the warranty to non-buyers, as well as providing a clear accrual rule for
bringing actions based upon the remote warranty."-' ' Furthermore, as the "pass through"
warranties were deemed express warranties they were also subject to the elements of
express warranties. For example, one of the elements that they were subject to was the
basis of the bargain test. In the proposed revision of article 2 they were named as
"obligation." In this context, in the proposed revision of article 2, the test of basis of the
bargain was eliminated. The elements that trigger the obligation under section 2-313 A
are placed in the subsection (b). Those elements are an affirmation of fact or promise
that relates to the goods or a description that relates to the goods or a remedial promise.
Those elements must be in a record packaged with or accompanying the goods and they
must be furnished to the remote purchaser.
b) CONFIRMATION: PRIVITY IS NOT REQUIRED
Another implication of drafting the "pass through" warranties in a separate and
independent section is the express recognition and confirmation that lack of privity is not
a defense. This is recognized in section 2-313 A (a) (3) through defining "the seller" and
"the remote purchaser". This confirmation also eliminates the risk of remote purchaser's
recovery of damages when the intermediate seller becomes insolvent or out of business.
In this context, a remote purchaser, when the intermediate seller becomes insolvent or is
out of business, can bring an action against the seller based on section 2-313 A without
See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective ofRevised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga ofa Search
for Balance. 52 Smu. L. Rev. 1683, 1699-1700(1999).
' See Rusch, supra note 2 1 6, at 1 700.
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the requirement of privity. However, section 2-313 A does not allow an extension
beyond a remote purchaser to the donee or any voluntary transferee who is not a buyer or
lessee. Unlike the practice under the present article 2 the third party other than the
remote purchaser cannot bring an action against a remote seller. According to the
preliminary comment 2 of section 2-3 1 3 A:
"The party to whom the obligation runs under this section may either buy or lease
the goods, and thus the term 'remote purchaser' is used. The term is more limited
than 'purchaser' in article 1. however, and does not include a donee or any
voluntary transferee who is not a buyer or lessee. Moreover, the remote purchaser
must be part of the normal chain of distribution for the particular product. That
chain will by definition include at least three parties and may well include more-
for example, the manufacturer might sell first to a wholesaler, who would the
resell the goods to a retailer for sale or lease to the public. A buyer or lessee from
the retailer would qualify as a remote purchaser and could invoke this section
against either the manufacturer or the wholesaler (if the wholesaler provided a
record to the retailer to be furnished to the ultimate party), but no subsequent
transferee, such as used-goods buyer or sublessee, could qualify. The law
governing assignment and third-party beneficiary, including section 2-318, must
be consulted to determine whether a party other than the remote purchaser can
enforce an obligation created under this section."-'**
Therefore, one can say that for the persons other than the remote purchaser,
sections other than 2-313 A is applicable. In other words, only the persons who buys the
product in the normal distribution chain are entitled under this section to qualify as a
remote purchaser and sue the remote seller under this section. People other than the
remote purchaser can sue according to section 2-3 1 8 or other regulations.
The change from "express warranty" to "obligation" creates tension with the
rationale of the economic loss doctrine. The revision embraces the second analytical
approach of the current case law. It can be said that the drafters drafted the section as if
there was no bargain between the remote purchaser and the seller. Therefore, with this.
-'* Amencan Law Institute. Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article 2. Sales. Discussion Draft
(Apnl 14. 2000). §2-313 A. cmt. 2. at 64
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all statements about the good, which are written on a label or in a booklet and are
received with the good, create an obligation. The obligation exists even if the remote
purchaser is totally unaware of the "pass through" warranties at the time of the purchase.
Therefore, there is no need to establish reliance or to prove that the statements are part of
the basis of the bargain. This can be realized through the preliminary comment 1 to
section 2-313 A, which reads:
"No direct contract exists between the seller and the remote purchaser, and thus
the seller's obligation under this section is not referred to as an 'express
warranty.' Use of "obligation" rather than 'express warranty' avoids any
inference that the basis of the bargain test is applicable here. The test for whether
an obligation other than a remedial promise arises is similar in some respects to
the basis of the bargain test, but the test herein is exclusive. Because 'remedial
promise' in Section 2-313 is not subject to the basis of the bargain test that term is
used in this section."''*^
However, with the application of reasonable person standard a seller can rebut
this presumption that the remote purchaser would not believe that affirmation of fact,
promise or description did not create an obligation. In this context, one can say that the
seller escapes responsibility for puffing under 2-31 3A(c). According to this, subsection
2-313 A (b) provides:
"if a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods, or
provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise, in a
record packaged with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably
expects the record to be, and the record is, fiimished to the remote purchaser, the
seller has an obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the
affirmation of fact, promise or description unless a reasonable person in the
position of the remote purchaser would not believe that the affirmation of fact,
promise or description created an obligation, and an obligation to the remote
purchaser that the seller will perform the remedial promise."
This situation is also mentioned in the preliminary comment 5 of section 2-3 13A:
:i4 Amencan Law Institute. Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article 2, Sales, Discussion Draft
(Apnl 14. 2000), §2-313 A. cmt. I,at63.
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"[T]he seller is entitled to shape the scope of the obligation, and the seller's
language must be considered in context. If a reasonable person in the position of
the remote purchaser, reading the seller's language as a whole, would not believe
that an affirmation of fact, promise or description created an obligation, there is
no liability under this section."""
c) RESTRICTION OF THE "PASS THROUGH"
WARRANTY PACKAGE
In the subsection 2-313 (A) (d) (I) limitations on the "pass through" warranties
are confirmed. According to this a seller can limit the remedies available to the remote
purchaser if the limitation is furnished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of
purchase. The statutory language requires the furnishing of the restriction. It does not
demand demonstrated agreement to them by the buyer. Thus, the revision adopts the
view of these cases that bind the buyer by "pass through" restriction. Bearing in mind
that the "pass through" warranties are comprehensive, obviously the remote purchaser
will receive the limitation with the good. The limitation is written in the warranty
package and until she opens the box of the good, she will not be aware of the limitation.
Therefore, it can be said that there is a possibility of unconscionable terms to be imposed
over the remote purchaser, since there is an inequality of bargaining power between the
seller and the remote purchaser.
d) ELIMINATION OF LOST PROFIT CLAIMS
In the subsection 2-313 A (d) (2) it is stated that the seller is not liable for the lost
profits. Regarding the recovery of the damages, a remote purchaser to whom the
obligation is extended cannot recover consequential damages for loss of profits. The
Amencan Law institute. Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article 2, Sales, Discussion Draft
(Apnl 14. 2000). § 2-313 A. cmt. 5. at 64
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drafters kept the consequential damages in the scope of recovery, however, they provide
a total insulation for loss profit claims. This seems to be a major change in existing law.
The buyer has no loss profits claim even though the buyer has not agreed to give up this
right. Under the present law "if there is a failure of the essential purpose, the limitation
of the express warranty to a warranty of repair or replacement will fail and the buyer has
available the array of Code remedies."-' Section 2-715 is one of the available remedies
under the revision, which governs the consequential damages resulting from the breach.
They are available in addition to the incidental and difference in value damages. One
may ask why the loss of profits — only one particular form of economic loss ~ cannot be
recovered. It can be argued that section 2-313 A balances the imposition of liability on
sellers against the unlimited scope of the loss of profits of the remote purchaser. In other
words, a remote seller cannot predict the scope of the usage of the product he sells or its
benefit to the remote purchaser. Therefore, one can say that the drafters tried to balance
the unexpected and unrestricted amounts of lost profits through not allowing the remote
purchaser to recover the lost profits in the form of consequential damages. However, on
the other hand, lost profit damages are vitally crucial when the remote purchaser is a
commercial consumer. For instance, Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp..-" provides a powerful
defense against the exclusion of lost profits. In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that:
"where a seller provides goods to a manufacturing enterprise with knowledge that
they are to be used in the manufacturing process, it is reasonable to assume that he
should know the defective goods will cause a disruption of production, and loss of
profits is a natural consequence of such disruption. Hence, loss of profits should
be recoverable under those circumstances."—
"'
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 7.04 [1], at 7-54.
-- See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 438 F.2d 500 (8"^ Cir. 1971 ).
-^ See Mobil Oil Corp.. 438 F.2d. at 5 1 0- 1 1
.
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Therefore, one can say that subsection (d) (2) of section 2-313 A sees the problem
from one aspect, i.e. from the consumer aspect. Therefore, at least a balance should have
been built between the consumer and the commercial consumers regarding lost profits.
CHAPTER IV
ADVERTISING WARRANTIES
A. REGULATION UNDER CURRENT ARTICLE 2
1. CASE LAW RECOGNIZING ADVERTISING AFFIRMATIONS
AS EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In the modem era "for markets to operate effectively, buyers must have accurate
information about the quality and other characteristics of the products offered for sale.""^
In this connection, "with mass marketing, the manufacturer is removed from the
purchaser, sales are accomplished through intermediaries and the demand for products is
created primarily by advertising media.""*
Statements in advertising which are found to be part of the basis of the bargain are
held by the courts to be express warranties under the present article 2 even though there is
no privity of contract between the advertiser and the buyer and no negotiation between
these actors."*
-" See Richard a. Posner, Regulation of advertising By The FTC : Evaluation Study, at 3
(1973).
-J-
See Note, 36 So. Cal. L. Rev. 291. 294.
'-'' Seee.g. 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 5.01 [2] at 5-4; Castelaz ei.al., supra note 33. at §
696. see e.g. General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips. 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Community
T.V. Serv. Inc.. v. Dressor Indus. Inc.. 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir), rehg denied. 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir. 1978)
(advertising catalog descnbing T.V. tower); Taylor v. Alfama 481 A.2d 1059 (Vt. 1984)(car advertised as
in mint condition with rebuilt engine).
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Express warranties have been held to be created by the use of particular
statements in advertising with respect to automobiles and automobile accessories,"'
batteries,"* cosmetics and hair preparations,"*^ equipment and machinery ,-^'^ insulation,-^'
preparations for agricultural use or for livestock,--'- and sporting goods. -^^ A remote
purchaser in order to recover under an express warranty stemming from the advertising
warranties must establish that the manufacturer's advertisement contains an affirmation
of fact or description of goods, which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. However,
"where advertising is involved, especially in national media like television or magazines,
the argument can thus be made that there is such a high degree of skepticism among
consumers that no reasonable person accepts the representation made as accurate product
information on which they may rely."-^" "In some instances, the language of an
advertisement might be regarded merely as an affumation of the value of the advertised
-^ See e.g. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (CA 6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254 (6"" Cir. 1960)
(advertisement that certain tires would fit any nm and had certain safety features); Ghema v. Ford Motor
Co. (1" Dist.) 246 Cal. App.2d 639. 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (advertisement that a certain kind of car was
designed and built to give road performance required by the most exacting motonng enthusiasts); Scheuler
V. Aamco Transmissions. Inc., 1 Kan. App.2d 525. 571 P.2d 48 (1977) (advertising as to automatic
transmission); Funk v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp. (2d Dept.) 23 App. Div.2d 771, 258 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1965)
(advertisement of safety windshield on car). An automobile manufacturer's radio, television, magazine,
and newspaper advertisements extolling the virtues of its products are made for the ultimate purchasers
who use and dnve the products, and form part of the warranty that the manufacturer gives the ultimate
consumer. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Term. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (disapproved on
other grounds by Kyker v. General Motor Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 )( action for injury caused
by defective brakes.); see also Castelaz et.al. supra note 33. at § 697.
--' Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Electnc Co. (CA 10 Colo.) 482 F 2d 1307 (1973).
-'^ See e.g. Spiegel v. Saks 34'^ street, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852, affd (2d Dept.) 26 App. Div.2d 660, 272
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1964).
-^^ See e.g. KJein v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (CA4 Md) 773 F.2d 1421 (1985).
-^\ Neville Constr. Co. v. Cook Paint & Vamish Co. (CA8 Neb.) 671 F.2d 1 107 (1982).
See e.g. Sawan, Inc.. v. Amencan Cyanamid Co.. 21 1 Ga. 764, 88 S.E.2d 152, conformed to 92 Ga.
App. 598, 89 S.E.2d 565 (1955) (advertisement of seed com fumigant described as not injuring or
damaging germinative quality of seed).
-" Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal.3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681. 534 P 2d 377 (1975) (golf training device was
'completely safe ball will not hit player."); See also Castelaz ei.al.. supra note 33, at 697.
Wayne K. Lewis, Toward .A Theory ofStrict 'Claim' Liability: Warranty Relief For .Ad\'ertising
Representations. 47 OHIO Si. L.J. 671, 679 ( 1986); m the same article it was also stated that "according to
Newspaper Advertising Bureau, only 39% of viewers regard TV ads as believable.", n. 62.
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the advertiser's opinion or commendation
concerning the goods, and thus does not create a warrant)'."^" In this context, a court
held that ''advertisements and promotional literature can be a part of the basis of the
bargain where they are prepared and furnished by a seller to induce the purchase of its
product and the buyer relies on the representations."-^^
An advertisement, catalog, or brochure can contain representations that constitute
an express warranty even when a warranty is not intended.-^' In order to determine, and
so as to provide a breach of warranty action to recover for injury caused by the product,
whether a statement in an advertisement amounts to a warranty of the advertised product
"depends on the circumstances, and the alleged warranty language of the advertisement
in question and the context in which such language is used."-^*
2. LACK OF PRIVITY DOES NOT BAR ACTION
Typically the advertiser of the product is the manufacturer or some related
company that does not have a contract with the ultimate buyer. In this context,
advertising warranties can be described as "non-privity warranties" at least in the sense
that the advertiser and the ultimate buyer do not manifest consent to the same contract.
Although the remote purchaser and the manufacturer whose good is advertised, have no
""" See Castelaz et.al.. supra note 33, at § 692.
"^^ See John R. Trentacosta. Article 2--Warranties and Warranty Disclaimers. 70 MiCH. B. J. 278 (1991 ).
see also Cooper Paintings & Coatings v. SCM Corp.. 457 S.W.2d 864 (1970).
--"
Cf. Neville Constr. Co.. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co.. 671 F.2d 1 107 (8'^ Cir. 1982); Sylvestn v. Warner
& Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Keith v. Buchanan. 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App.1985);
Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.. 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Hams v. Belton. 65 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Crest Container Corp., v. R.H. Bishop Co.. 445 N.E. 2d 19 (111. App. Ct.
1982); Scheuler v. Aainco Transmissions. Inc., 571 P.2d 48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Randy Knitwear, Inc.. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181
N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1962); Rogers v. Tom Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958); Dner v.
Perfection. Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).
See Castelaz et.al.. supra note 33, at § 692.
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direct contractual relation, the remote purchaser may well rely on the express warranties
in the advertisement. In the well-known Randy Knitwear Inc., v. American Cyanamid
Co.,-^^ the Court of Appeals of New York declared that:
"[T]he world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct contract; it
is, rather, a world of advertising and when representations expressed and
disseminated in the mass communications media and on labels attached to the
goods themselves, prove false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason of
his reliance on those representations, it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's
denial of liability on the sole ground of the absence of technical privity.
Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals and other media to
call attention, in glowing terms, to the qualities and virtues of their products and
this advertising is directed at the ultimate consumer or at some manufacturer or
supplier who is not in privity with them. It is highly unrealistic to limit a
purchaser's protection to warranties made directly to him by his immediate seller.
The protection he really needs is against the manufacturer whose published
representations caused him to make the purchase. "-'*°
Express warranties created through mass media advertisements addressed to the
public are also captured perfectly in Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Company*^ as
"[I]t is the consumer whom the bottling companies are trying to persuade when
they proclaim in neon lights from atop tall buildings, and by every other known
advertising medium, that this cola and that crush are refreshing, delicious,
delightfully nonfattening, and just the drink for you. The consumer is their mark
even though the manufacturers have no direct contract with him. It is to shut
one's eyes and ears in today's world of advertising to say that, because no
reassuring words appear on the product's container, the manufacturer of
nationally advertised product has made no representation to the purchaser. He
makes one every day — sometimes every hour on hour. Any food entitled to
status as a famous name brand has been warranted by the manufacturer to the
consumer — very probably in color - in magazines, on billboards, and by
glamorous stars of stage and screen over radio and television."-''-
Since "the rationale is that the advertiser has, by its actions, created the market for
the products by making claims about their quality and performance that induce
-^"^ Randy Knitwear Inc., v. Amencan Cyanamid Co.. 1 1 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1962).
-"^^ See Randy Knin^ear Inc.. 11 N.Y.2d at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
-^' See Terry v. Double Cola Bonling Co.. 263 N.C. 1 . 1 38 S.E.2d 753 ( 1 964).
-*- See Double Cola Bottling Co.. 263 N.C. at 13, 138 S.E.2d 761.
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consumers to purchase them"-^\ a remote purchaser, who is not in privity with the
manufacturer, who advertises his product through mass media, can bring an action on the
non-privity basis for breach of warranty. The manufacturer's aim in placing his goods
upon the market and warranting through advertising is to induce the consumer to rely
upon his representations and purchase the goods. Therefore, it cannot be said that a
manufacturer had no intention of warranting in the advertisement made to public through
mass media and consequently he cannot avoid his responsibilities, "when the expected
use leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he made no contract directly with the
user.""^ In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co..'^- the Supreme Court of New Jersey
indicated that "with the advent of large scale advertising by the manufacturers to promote
the purchase of their goods from the dealers by members of the public, provided a basis
upon which the existence of express warranties was predicated, even though the
manufacturer was not a party to the contract of sale."-'**
Furthermore, in Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.r^^ the court decided that
advertisements concerning Vantage cigarettes, which were published in the various issues
of "Parade", "Penthouse", "Playboy", "Life", and "Look" magazines, and which
commented on the Vantage's "great taste" and low tar and contained the Surgeon
General's warning about the effects of smoking, created an express warranty. In Rogers
V. Toni Home Permanent Co.,-*^ the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "a consumer could
sue the manufacturer of a product for breach of express warranties arising from published
-"' See Lewis, supra note 234, at 678 ( 1 986).
-*^ See Rand}- Knihxear Inc.. II N.Y.2d at 13. 181 N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
-*' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co.. 32 N.J. 358. 161 A.2d 69 ( 1960).
-^ See Bloomfield Motor Co.. 32 N.J. at 372-73. 161 A.2d at 77.
-" Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 1988 WL 123930 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
-^*' Rogers v. Tom Home Permanent Co.. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
65
advertisements, although no privity of contract existed between the consumer and the
manufacturer."-"" Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio added that "the warranties
made by the manufacturer in his advertisements and by the labels on his products are
inducements to the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held to strict
accountability to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on such representations
and later suffers injury because the product proves to be defective or deleterious."-'"
Therefore, one can say that according to this decision an injured consumer who relies
upon the express warranty to his detriment can recover even though there is no direct
privity of contract between him and the manufacturer. One step further, in Drayton v.
Jiffee Chemical Corp.,--^ it was held that "television advertisements that product was
"safe" and capable of "fast action", which representations the purchaser allegedly relied
on, were properly considered express warranties as to safety of the product for human
contact."^- According to this case warranties made in the advertisement to public
through mass media can create an express warranty. Furthermore, a consumer who relies
on the advertisement can bring an action against the manufacturer on a non-privity basis
for the breach of express warranty.--' In all of these decisions one can say that courts
recognized the right of the remote purchaser who relied on the advertising warranty of the
manufacturer to sue on the non-privity basis. In brief, a buyer may bring an action
directly on a non-privity basis to a manufacturer who advertised his products through
mass media and make an express warranty.
-"" See Tom Home Permanent Co.. 167 Ohio St. at 249. 147 N.E.2d at 615.
--^ See Toni Home Permanent Co.. 167 Ohio St. at 249, 147 N.E.2d at 61 5.
;-
' See Drayton v. JifTee Chemical Corporation. 591 F.2d 352 (6'^ Cir. 1978).
" See Jiffee Chemical Corp.. 591 F.2dat352.
-"
.As a supplement to those decisions m Omaha Pollution Control Corp.. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp.. (413
F. Supp. 1069 (1976)) it was referred to Hawkins Construction Co.. v. Matthews Co... (190 Neb. 546, 209
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3. IMPORTANCE OF BUYER RELIANCE ON MEDIA
ADVERTISING
Although the courts debate whether demonstrated reliance on the warranty
affirmation by the claimant buyer is generally required for an express warranty action,-'"*
decisions dealing with public advertising seem to place particular emphasis on the
reliance requirement. A typical judicial statement is: "assuming that an advertisement's
statement regarding a product may be regarded as an express warranty, a person injured
by the product cannot recover from the advertiser on the ground of breach of express
warranty without showing reliance on the statement in question. "-"' Furthermore,
according to American Tobacco Co. Inc., v. Grinnell -^'^ an express warranty claim under
section 2-313 is available where the seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise
relating the goods sold which becomes the basis of the bargain, thereby inducing reliance
on the part of the buyer. The defendant, a tobacco company, won summary judgment as
against the plaintiffs claims for breach of express warranty as well as fraud, fraudulent
concealment and negligent misrepresentation by proving conclusively that plaintiff did
not rely upon the advertisements in question in choosing to smoke defendant's cigarettes
and the plaintiff admitted that he did not see the advertisement. Torres v. Northwest
N.W.2d 643 (1973)) and it was decided that a manufacturer or seller may be held liable under such an
advertismg warranty even though he is not in pnvity of contract with the purchaser.
-'''See e.g.. Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964); Connolly v.
Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963); Jones v. Kellner, 451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio App. 1982); see
e.g. Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C.. Inc.. 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552. (1979), in which it was stated that "the
element of reliance need not always be expressly alleged, it can often be inferred from allegations of mere
purchase or use if the natural tendency of the representations made is such as to induce such purchase or
use." 298 N.C. at 501 n. 7, 259 S.E.2d at 557 n.7; Hawkins Construction Co., v. Matthews Co.. 190 Neb.
546, 564-66, 209 N.W.2d 643. 654-55 (1973), holding that distribution of an advertising brochure with
express representations about the product sufficed for a finding of express warranty.
--- See e.g. Gardner v. Q.H.S.. Inc.. (CA4 SO 448 F.2d 238 ( 1971 ); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
(CA 6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254 (1960); Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. (2d Dist.) 255 Cal. App.2d
806. 63 Cal.Rptr. 454(1967).
-•'*' Sff Amencan Tobacco Co. Inc.. v. Gnnnell. 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1998).
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Engineering^-' joins those opinions in holding that a buyer need not show reliance in
order to create an express warranty. However, the court does not conclude that where a
buyer claims an express warranty based on advertising, the evidence must show that the
buyer read the advertisement.
The presumption of warranty recognized in comment 3 to section 2-313 is limited
to statements made by the seller "during a bargain". Thus, it is possible to argue that
media advertising does not quality as being made "during a bargain" and is not entitled to
a presumption of warranty, therefore, requiring the buyer to demonstrate reliance, which
is distant in time and place. White and Summers support this view stating that:
"one would not regard an advertisement as being made during a bargain and
therefore no statement in an advertisement would normally qualify for the
presumption that may be authorized in comment 3. At a minimum a plaintiff in
such a case should have to testify that he or his agent knew of and relied upon the
advertisement in making the purchase."*^*
In this regard. White and Summers "interpret the comment as being applicable
only to face-to-face dealings that occur while the deal is still warm."-''^ Briefly one can
say that their view supports a reliance approach for the creation of an express warranty.
Actually, this interpretation is correct when the philosophy of the drafting of the UCC is
taken into consideration. However, if a remote buyer does not see the advertisement
addressed to the public, one can say that she will also be subject the express warranty
represented on the advertising material, since a manufacturer advertises his product in the
mass media with the knowledge and the intention that they will be read by the public. In
other words, one can say that the manufacturer assumes the responsibility to be sued by
:5«
254
See Torres v. Northwest Engineenng. 86 Haw. 383. 949 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1998).
See White & Svmmers supra note 10, § 9-5. at 353.
See Chad R. Brown, An Analysis ofthe Interpretation ofthe "Basis of the Bargain " Language of
Section 2-313. 104 COM. L. J. 316. 322 (1999).
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the remote purchaser, who has not read the advertisement addressed to the pubhc in the
mass media but affected by the defective product. Therefore, a non-privity action can be
brought against the manufacturer who makes warranties in the advertising addressed to
the public in the mass media and privity will not be a bar when dealing with the express
warranties arising out of advertising. Furthermore, one can say that lack of privity will
not be a bar for recovery where only economic loss is involved
4. RELATIONSHIP OF ADVERTISING TO FORMAL
WARRANTY DOCUMENTS
Another aspect of the advertising warranties addressed to the public through mass
media is that they are non-negotiated. Instead, "they arise from affirmations or promises
contained in advertising pitched broadly to numerous potential customers."-^ Therefore,
the consumer has no chance to negotiate over the terms of the warranty made in
advertisement addressed to the public in mass media. Furthermore, advertising
warranties are non-comprehensive since in the advertisement the manufacturer does not
set out the limitations on the warranty such as exclusion of consequential damages. An
attempt to state those limitations may be made as part of the ultimate sale either through
use of a negotiated contract or a "pass through" warranty document. Issues arise as to the
relationship between the advertising and the formal warranty document. At this point, it
is crucial to determine whether the statements in the advertising ~ which are seen before
the sales brochure, the catalog or the warranty package received with the product — are
binding and constitute a basis of the bargain independent of the formal warranty, and
whether there is a difference between the advertising warranty and the written warranty,
See Adler. supra note 5 1 . at 457.
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which is received later. In this context, "the presence of a formal warranty document
does not in itself preclude separate recognition of informal warranty."-"' But at the same
time specific clauses in the formal warranty document may invoke the parol evidence
rule and thereby prevent the informal statements that are made before or after execution
or delivery of the warranty from being effective.-" According to one view, "given the
capacity of informal and formal warranties to coexist, a critical role of an informal
express warranty is to amplify or explain the statements in the formal warranty often to
the disadvantage of the seller."-"' In this connection, "informal statements in advertising
and sales presentation may amplify the carefully structured language of formal
commitments, and provide means by which a frustrated buyer can recover economic
losses"-*^ In the case law development this situation has been reflected in a variety of
cases. For instance, in Community TV Service Inc., v. Dresser Indus. Inc.,'^- the formal
contract stated precisely that a TV tower could stand pressure of 60 Ibs/sq. foot.
Advertising indicated that the tower would safely withstand winter wind and ice loads.
The tower was judged by whether it performed up to the standard of the advertising and
buyer recovered judgment for $ 1 .2 million. In Select Port Inc., v. Babcock Swine Inc.,-^
the formal contract described pigs being sold simply as "Midwestern Gilt." Advertising
described this strain as the gilt of the fijture, a product of 3 pureline strains which is SPF
like {i.e., specific pathogen free). Buyer obtained an award of $ 352, 700 based on
breach of the warranty created by the advertisement. In Ricwil, Inc., v. S.L. Pappas &
-"'
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05. at 5-60.
"- See generally 1 McDONNELL & COLEMAN. 5wpro note 30, § 5.09.
-"
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05. at 5-60.
-"
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05. at 5-60.
-"' Community TV Service Inc.. v. Dresser Indus. Inc.. 586 F.2d 637 (g"" Cir.), reh g denied, 586 F.2d 637
(8"'Cir. 1978).
-""
Select Port Inc., v. Babcock Swine Inc.. 640 F.2d 147 (8"' Cir. 1981).
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Co.r''^ a product brochure advertising "Pre-insulated Piping System for Buried Hot and
Chilled Water Domestic Hot Water and Condense Lines to 250 °F" expressly warranted
that the pipe would withstand water temperatures to 250 degrees; the warranty was not
limited to a repair commitment.
Whether the written contract bars proof of an express warranty based on
promotional materials under the parol evidence rule is a crucial issue. An important
discussion of this issue appears in In re Lone Star Industries-^. This case was brought by
railroad entities as a result of the premature cracking and deterioration of concrete
railroad ties. The plaintiffs alleged that they were reluctant to buy concrete, rather than
the traditional wood ties, and that Lone Star persuaded them to agree to the more
expensive ties through promotional material emphasizing long-life and low maintenance.
The court replied that the full actual record must be developed before it can be
determined whether the written contract was the complete integration of the agreement.-*'''
"If after full factual background is developed, the court admits the promotional
material, the representations contained therein may well simplify the formal
written contract between the railroads and Lone Star. The manner in which the
courts either permit or deny amplification depending on the particular facts of the
transaction illustrates the search for bargain in fact which article 2 was designed
to encourage." -™
A second issue concerning the relationship of advertising affirmations to the
formal warranty documents is whether the liability limitation features of the formal
document will apply when the action is brought based on the separate advertising
-"' See Ricwil. Inc.. v. S.L Poppas & Co.. 599 So.2d 1 126 (Ala. 1992).
''*'
In re Lone Star Industries lib F.Supp. 206 (D.Md. 1991 ).
'' The court noted that in Community T V Services Inc.. v. Dresser Indus. Inc.. (586 F.2d 637 (8"" Cir.)
reh 'g denied. 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir. 1978)). it was the jury decided that promotional matenal amplified the
wntten agreement, see 1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05. at 5-62.
'"
1 McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05, at 5-63.
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affirmation. The warranty package included in the formal document will typically have a
number of protective provisions for the warrantor including such matters as notice
requirements, exclusions of consequential liabilities and time requirements for bringing
suit. The present case law seems to say very little about this issue. It is possible to
visualize the advertising as an independent warranty. It is also possible to visualize the
formal warranty contract as amending or supplementing the earlier warranty affirmation
of the advertising. In reality it seems the contractual relationship develops over time. If
the formal warranty contract is expressly negotiated, a strong case can be made that it
should control. On the other hand, if the formal document is a non-negotiated "pass
through" warranty, one is presented with another illustration of the problem of the
"rolling contract", the status of which remains unclear in contemporary contract law and
has troubled the article 2 revision process.
In an action against the manufacturer of a product used in performing certain
medical tests, the court stated "the trial court did not err in directing a verdict for
defendant on plaintiffs charge that the defendant, in its sales brochure, warranted the
safety of the product, where the physician stated that he used the product in reliance, not
upon the brochure, but upon experience. "'' However, "the difficulty of the reliance
standard is that advertisements, which may create an express warranty, are often difficult
to identify due to the vast number of advertisements and the time which may pass before
a buyer actually purchases a good."'"- Because, advertising warranties are addressed to
the general public, remote purchaser sees the advertisement before she buys the product
and in a different place than that of the ultimate sale transaction. In this connection, "the
J"'
Ball V. Mallinkrodt Chemical Works. 53 Term. App. 218. 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).
See Brown, supra note 259. at 320.
problem with the reliance approach is that if the burden of proving reliance is on the
buyer, he may not recover because of the difficulty of tracing his reliance to the
advertisement."-'^ Comment 3 to the 2-313 leaves open the case where the buyer only
reads a brochure or advertisement about a product and does not bargain or negotiate. At
this point it is worth mentioning that "the confusion is whether the consumer must have
read, understood, and relied on the representations in advertisements and the key is
whether the reliance in advertisements is necessary."-^"
Finally, the advertised product must have a relation to the statements used on the
advertising material. Regarding that issue it was stated that:
"[MJanufacturers' mass media advertising warranties is admissible in evidence as
a warranty if the buyer can link the ads with the automobile purchased.
Warranties in advertising have been useful in breaking the privity barrier which
manufacturers use in defending themselves against damage suits. For example, if
the manufacturer has advertised its automobile to be trouble free, economical in
operation, and built with high quality workmanship, the manufacturer may have
difficulty arguing that its written warranty is limited to repair of defective
parts.""-
The court in Inglis v. American Motors Corp.-'^ said that just such advertised
promises permitted the buyer to recover damages from the manufacturer in the form of
diminution in value of the automobile caused by latent defects. In New York, statements
made in defendant's advertising to the effect that a boat was of high quality do not create
an express warranty under 2-313 because, as mentioned earlier, statements in the form of
seller's talk and puffing are not deemed as an express warranty. -^^ In other words, the
"''^ See BrowTi. supra note 259, at 320.
* See BrowTi. supra note 259, at 322.
"' Roger D. Billings, Jr., Handling Automobile Warranty and Repossession Cases, at § 6.7
(1992).
""
Inglis V. Amencan Motors Corp.. 3 Ohio St.2d 132. 32 Ohio Op.2d 136. 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
-'^
Cf. Simone v. Genmar Indus. Inc., 1989 A.M.C. 2627. 2629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) "holding that advertising
that boat was of 'uncompromising quality" and 'skillfully crafted and integrated' did not create express
warranty that boat was seaworthy and soundly manufactured."
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"puffing" limitation on the creation of express warranties fully applies to advertising
warranties.
In short, advertising warranties are subject to section 2-313 of the Code, and
therefore constitute an express warranty. They can be found in the mass media, catalogs
and brochures. Therefore, the statements on the advertisement constitute the statements
of the manufacturer and create an express warranty directed to the remote purchasers.
Technically, there is no bargain between the manufacturer and the remote purchaser.
Nonetheless, if the remote purchaser sees the advertisement or does not see the
advertisement yet relies on it, she can sue the manufacturer on the basis of the breach of
express warranty in the event that there is a defect on the product.
B. THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
Section 2-313 B is new and follows the case law and the practice in extending a
seller's obligations regarding new goods to remote purchasers. This section deals with
obligations to a remote purchaser created through a medium for communication with the
public, primarily through advertising. The explicit treatment of advertising warranties is
in section 2-313 B which reads as follows:
Section 2-313 B Obligation to Remote Purchaser Created By
Communication to Public
(a) In this section:
(1) "Goods" means new goods sold or leased as new goods in a transaction of
purchase that occurs in the normal chain of distribution.
(2) "Immediate buyer" means a buyer that enters into a contract with the
seller.
(3) "Remote purchaser" means a person that buys or leases goods from an
immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of distribution.
(b) If a seller makes an affirmation n of fact or promise that relates to the goods, or
provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise in
advertising or a similar communication to the public and the public and the
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remote purchaser enters into a transaction of purchase with knowledge of and
with the expectation that the goods will conform to the affirmation of fact,
promise or description or that the seller will perform the remedial promise, the
seller has an obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the
affirmation of fact, promise or description unless a reasonable person in the
position of the remote purchaser would not believe that the affirmation of fact,
promise or description created an obligation, and an obligation to the remote
purchaser that the seller will perform the remedial promise.
(c) It is not necessary to the creation of an obligation under this section that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that the seller have a
specific intention to undertake an obligation, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create an obligation.
(d) The following rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation created
under this section:
(1) The seller may modify or limit the remedies available to the remote
purchaser if the modification or limitation is furnished to the remote
purchaser no later than the time of purchase. The modification or
limitation may be furnished as part of the communication that contains the
affirmation of fact, promise or description.
(2) Subject to a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in breach is
liable for incidental or consequential damages under section 2-715 but the
seller is not liable for lost profits.
(3) The remote purchaser may recover as damages for breach of a seller's
obligation arising under subsection (b) the loss resuhing in the ordinary
course of events as determined in any manner, which is reasonable.
(e) An obligation that is not a remedial promise is breached if the goods did not
conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or description creating the obligation when
the goods left the seller's control.
In the March draft, in section 2-3 13B the approach of Randy Knitwear, Inc., v.
American Cyanamid Co.,'^'* was adopted. In that case, the court overruled its prior
decisions requiring privity on the ground that it was unrealistic to allow a manufacturer to
avoid liability after engaging in a heavy advertising campaign.
Again in section 2-313 B, the term "obligation" was used instead of "express
warranty." The elements that trigger the "obligation" arising out of advertising
-"' Randy Kjiitwear, Inc.. v. Amencan Cyanamid Co.. 1 1 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399
(1962)
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warranties made to the public are the affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the
goods, or a description provided by the advertiser seller or the remedial promise made in
advertising or in a similar communication to the public.
There are two defenses that can be raised by the seller: the reasonable person test
of 2-313 B (b) which was drafted as "reasonable person ...would not believe" and the
puffing defense of 2-313 B (c).
According to the reasonable person defense, a buyer who wishes to enforce an
advertised promise must prove that the buyer had an expectation that the goods would
conform to the advertised promise. One can say that the statements in the advertising
material are made with the purpose to induce the remote purchaser to buy the advertised
product. In this regard, it can be said that it is illogical to allow a seller to decline the
responsibility advertised as promises or representations about its product due to the
reason or assumption that a remote purchaser cannot prove which advertisement she saw
or because the remote purchaser's sale was induced by a person other than the remote
purchaser, who also was influenced by the advertised promise.
A second defense in favor of the seller is the puffing defense drafted in 2-3 1 3 B
(c). According to the language of this subsection, a "statement purporting to be merely
the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create an obligation." One
can say that advertising materials are carefully drafted; therefore, the chances that the
statements in the advertising materials are seller's talk is logically out of question. On
the other hand, it can be argued that this defense is a pro-seller defense, which enables the
seller to escape from the liability due to certain statements used in the advertising. In the
comment 3 to section 2-313 B it was stated that the purchaser must have a knowledge of
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the affirmation of fact, promise, description or remedial promise and must have an
expectation that the goods will conform or the seller will comply. This test is entirely
subjective, while the reasonable person test in subsection (b) is objective in nature.
In other words, according to comment 3 to section 2-313 B
"the seller will incur no liability to the remote purchaser if: a) the purchaser did
not have knowledge of the seller's statement at the time of purchase; b) the
remote purchaser knew of the seller's statement at the time of purchase but did
not expect the goods to conform or the seller to comply; c) a reasonable person in
the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that the seller's statement
created an obligation (this test does not apply to remedial promises), or d) the
seller's statement is puffing."-^''
In subsection 2-313 (d) (1) the availability of the limitation and the modification
remedies are set forth. Under the language of this subsection, it can easily be seen that
the possibility of limiting or modifying the remedies were given to the seller if the
modification or limitation was fiimished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of
the purchase. As with "pass throughs" it is not required that the buyer agree to these
limitations. However, a "pass through" document presented after the purchase can limit
the advertising warranty. Advertising warranties are made in a remote time and place.
Therefore, the risk of "pass throughs" limitation of the advertising warranties arises. In
other words, when the remote purchaser buys the goods after she sees the advertisement,
the limitations in the warranty package or in the label can limit the language used in the
advertising material. Section 2-313 B (d) (1) may be the most important subsection of
the revision in that it clearly establishes that advertisers may limit advertising
commitment by the formal warranty document introduced at or before the time of
purchase.
' Amencan Law Institute. Unifoim Commercial Code [New] Revised Article 2. Sales. Discussion Draft
(Apnl 14. 2000). § 2-313 B. cmt. 3. at 68.
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Section 2-313 B does not deal with the extension of the obligation to certain third
party beneficiaries. This was left to section 2-318, which deals with the third party
beneficiaries of warranties.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, one of the most controversial parts of the proposed revision of the
UCC article 2, the "pass through" and advertising warranties, had been examined. In the
course of the examination first a general overview regarding the express warranties under
the present article 2 was presented. Next, we explored the regulations of the "pass
through" and advertising warranties under the present article 2 and their regulation under
the proposed revision of article 2.
Under the proposed revision of article 2 the drafters planned to impose new
regulations regarding the "pass through" and advertising warranties. Naturally, new
implications arose out of those regulations. Those new regulations and their implications
can be summarized as follows:
With the proposed revision of article 2 it was confirmed that the privity was not
required anymore, since the "pass through" and advertising warranties were recognized
separately and expressly in article 2. It was recognized that a remote purchaser can sue a
manufacturer based on the ground that the manufacturer has breached its obligation
stemming from the section 2-313 A or section 2-313 B.
However, contrary to the basic concept that warranties are contractual, the
terminology of the sections are changed. "Obligation" rather than "express warranty" is
used. Use of the term "obligation" rather than "warranty" suggests that the underlying
nature of the liability is not contractual. Perhaps the liability should be considered to be
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in tort or to be statutory, but it does not seem to rest on a traditional agreement process.
The liability is imposed automatically based on acts of the seller {e.g. making an
affirmation that runs with the goods, providing a description of the goods in the
advertising). These acts are not required to be part of the basis of the bargain.
At the same time, the revision allows the warrantor to adhesively limit its liability.
The limitation of the remedies is also another controversial provision. In the subsection
2-313 (A) (d) (1) limitations on the remedy for the "pass through" warranties are
confirmed. According to this rule, a seller can limit the remedies available to the remote
purchaser if the limitation is furnished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of
purchase. The agreement of the remote purchaser to the terms of the warranty package is
not required. Arguably, this provision allows the warrantor to impose remedial
limitations unfairly. Advertising warranties are drafted similarly. Advertising warranties
drafted in 2-313 B are made in a remote time and place. However, according to
subsection 2-313 B (d) (1), the "pass through" terms or other documents may limit the
remedy for the advertising warranty if they are furnished no later than the time of
purchase. This provision can also create an unfair result against the remote purchaser.
Another new statutory protection for the warrantor is that advertising and "pass
through" warranties can produce a lost profit claim. The end result is that the buyer is
made the beneficiary of a statutory obligation despite the lack of a privity but the
warrantor can restrict its liability to the remote purchaser for violating that obligation.
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